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1 Summary 
The ongoing history of terrorists’ pattern in airports and on airplanes shows 
the importance of scientific research in that field, especially regarding x-ray 
image interpretation. X-ray technologies provide us with the inside view of 
luggage and allow to see the content of a bag without opening it. Drastic 
growth in such technologies has been made over the past few years. The 
quality of x-ray images is getting better and better, and especially the image 
resolution has improved substantially. Moreover a screener can use 
different image enhancement functions (IEFs) which should help screeners 
to find prohibited threat items in passenger bags more easily. State-of-the-
art x-ray machines provide automatic explosive detection algorithms, but 
they still have high false alarm rates. Therefore, the inspection task cannot 
be solved by the machine itself; the human operator has always the last 
decision. This decision is determined by the level of human performance 
which needs to take into account perceptual and cognitive characteristics. 
The goal is to achieve a consistent and high performance which can only be 
achieved when screeners are well trained and familiarized with different 
kinds of threat objects. The most expensive equipment is of limited value if 
the screener who operates it is not selected and trained appropriately.  
In this dissertation I focus on psychological aspects of a computer-based 
training system considering the scientific background of perceptual 
psychology, psychophysics, signal detection theory and human machine 
interactions. 
First, the question arises if so-called image enhancement functions (IEFs) 
really enhance threat detection performance of screeners. According to 
manufacturers, a screener should be able to achieve a higher detection 
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performance using such IEFs compared to the original image. In Chapter 2, 
I will discuss a study in which I could show that the original image always 
leads to better detection performance compared to the use of IEFs. These 
results extenuate the use of IEFs, especially during training: it takes more 
time to use them and therefore the learning process is weakened. In 
Chapter 3, automated image difficulty estimations are discussed. These 
automated image difficulty estimations are very important assumptions for 
an individually adaptive training system, because for each screener the 
difficulty of a bag and of a bag-to-threat combination can be calculated and 
therefore the progress in training can be optimally adapted individually to 
each screener. One of the main goals in this dissertation is to investigate 
how to increase screeners’ detection performance most effectively with 
computer based training. An overview of how screeners can be trained and 
how the effectiveness of such a training system can be proved is discussed 
in chapter 4. In different studies I could show that individually adaptive 
computer-based training (CBT) leads very effectively to an increased 
performance for detecting prohibited items in passenger bags. Moreover, 
transfer of knowledge from learned to new threat objects could also be 
proven. This is very important considering that a screener has not the 
possibility to learn every threat object existing in the world. Furthermore, the 
benefits and costs of a new technology which allows multi-view images of a 
passenger bag is empirically investigated and discussed in chapter 5. I 
could show that for some difficult conditions of bag-to-threat combinations, 
this technology can help to find threat objects more easily. An outlook of the 
usefulness of developing a training system for such a technology is 
contemplated. Finally, recommendations for training level achievement and 
training duration are discussed in chapter 6. These recommendations are 
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very important for authorities and also for supervisors when guidelines are 
prepared. All in all, I could show that individually adaptive training is one of 
the most important factors when screeners have to detect threat items in 
passenger bags reliably and effectively. 
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2 Image Enhancement Technology 
2.1 Do "Image Enhancement" Functions Really Enhance X-Ray 
Image Interpretation? 
 
2.1.1 Abstract 
State-of-the art x-ray screening systems offer a variety of so-called “image 
enhancement” functions (IEFs). Examples are color inversion, edge-
enhancement, organic only, metal only etc. IEFs are often promoted 
because they would bring out detail that is obscured or highlight certain 
features, such as for example organic content. In this study, we investigated 
the usefulness of IEFs for cabin baggage screening (CBS) and hold 
baggage screening (HBS) in airport security. The results showed that the 
standard image provided the best detection performance. Some IEFs 
impaired detection performance substantially, which was also dependent on 
threat type (guns, knives, improvised explosive devices, other threat items). 
Together with previous work (Klock, 2005), these results highlight the 
importance of systematically studying the usefulness of IEFs in order to 
optimize human-computer interaction in x-ray screening. 
2.1.2 Introduction 
In recent years, the importance of baggage x-ray screening at airports has 
increased dramatically. The image quality of older x-ray screening 
equipment was sometimes in need of improvement. For example an early 
version of a coloring algorithm as enhancement function did not serve the 
purpose of increasing detection performance of threat objects, actually it 
impaired it. This was due to the occlusion of object parts by the opaque 
coloring algorithm (Schwaninger, 2005a; Schwaninger, 2005b). But there 
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has been much technological progress in the last years, especially 
regarding x-ray screening machines, which nowadays provide high image 
quality and various image enhancement functions (IEFs). The main 
objective of such functions is to process an image so that the result is more 
suitable than the original image for a specific application as for example x-
ray screening at airports (Gonzalez & Woods, 2002). In x-ray images, the 
image enhancements might increase the visibility of objects within the bag 
and remove background noise. State-of-the-art x-ray machines provide 
many IEFs. The aim of this study is to investigate whether IEFs actually 
help human operators (screeners) to better detect threat items in x-ray 
images of passenger bags. Interestingly, reports regarding an evaluation of 
IEFs have not been publicly available except two recent publications (Klock, 
2005; Schwaninger, 2005b). Klock (2005) examined whether IEFs increase 
screeners’ threat detection performance when visually inspecting carry-on 
bags using a Rapiscan emulator. She found that high penetration, organic 
stripping and inorganic stripping functions resulted in decreased probability 
of detection (see below for more information on different IEFs). Crystal 
clear, black and white, and low penetration resulted in the best 
performance, while it should be noted that the original color image was not 
included in the analysis. Klock (2005) also found that these effects are 
dependent on threat type, i.e. whether guns, knives, improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) or other prohibited items had to be detected. Schwaninger 
(2005b) reported a study on the effects of IEFs for the detection of IEDs in 
hold baggage. He found that the original image resulted in the best 
performance, whereas the organic stripping, organic only and luminance 
negative functions substantially impaired detection of IEDs. The purpose of 
this study is to extend previous research in order to evaluate the value of 
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2.1.3.1  Participants 
A total of 443 airport security screeners of the CBS at a European airport 
participated in this study. All had on-the-job experience of at least 6 months. 
A between-subjects design was used to compare the effect of the IEFs on 
detection performance with each other. To this end, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of nine experimental groups, one group for each 
of the nine IEFs specified in Table 1. The control group was used for testing 
detection performance when images were displayed using the Original (OR) 
image type. The assignment of participants to groups was conducted so 
that the distribution of gender, age, and days on job were equal across 
groups. The ten groups showed an equal average of detection performance 
A’, which was calculated using data of a separate test conducted prior to 
this study. The experimental groups varied in size between 37 (Luminance 
Negative filter) and 66 screeners (Grayscale filter); the control group 
consisted of 39 screeners. The difference in the group sizes is due to 
missing values (i.e. incomplete tests) for several screeners who originally 
were assigned to the study. 
2.1.3.2  Method and Procedure 
The X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) was used in 
Experiment 1. This computer-based test contains 256 x-ray images of real 
passenger carry-on bags. Half of these images contain one prohibited item. 
The prohibited items have been selected by police experts to be 
representative for the variety of different threat types. The test contains 32 
x-ray images of passenger bags with guns, 32 images with knives, 32 
images with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and 32 images with other 
prohibited items. For further details on the X-Ray CAT, see Koller and 
Schwaninger (2006). In order to create the stimuli for Experiment 1, the 
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nine IEFs explained in Table 1 above were applied to the x-ray images. The 
participants’ task is to visually inspect the images and to judge whether they 
are OK (contain no prohibited item) or NOT OK (contain a prohibited item). 
In this study, images disappeared after 10 seconds. The experiment 
consisted of two blocks. In block 1, each of the 9 experimental groups was 
tested with only one IEF and the control group was tested with the Original 
image (OR). The purpose of block 2 was to confirm that the participant 
groups are equivalent regarding their x-ray image interpretation 
competency. In block 2, all participants were tested again using the same 
bags as in block 1 but images were displayed in the OR format (see Table 
1). 
2.1.4 Results and Discussion 
Detection performance 
was measured using 
A’, a measure derived 
from hit and false 
alarm rates (Pollack & 
Norman, 1964; see 
Hofer & Schwaninger, 
2004 for x-ray     
image interpretation 
competency). The hit 
rate refers to the 
proportion of all images containing a prohibited item that have been judged 
as NOT OK. The false alarm rate refers to the proportion of NOT OK 
judgments for harmless bags. A’ scores were calculated for each block 
separately. Figure 1 shows means and standard errors of A’ scores of block 
Figure 1: Detection performance Experiment 1, block 1, pooled across threat 
categories. IEFs were tested between participant groups: GR = Grayscale, LH 
= Luminance High, LL = Luminance Low, LN = Luminance Negative, MO = 
Metal Only, MS = Metal Stripping, OO = Organic Only, OS = Organic 
Stripping, SE = Super Enhancement, OR = Original (control group). 
GR LH LL LN MO MS OO OR OS SE
Enhancement
D
et
ec
tio
n 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (A
')
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1 broken up by IEF and pooled across threat categories, including the 
results of the control group (OR). The results in Figure 1 suggest that the 
OR image type results in the best performance, while some IEFs result in 
substantial impairment of detection performance. Note that due to security 
reasons, A’ scores are not shown in the figures. To estimate effect sizes we 
employ effect size analysis and interpret the results based on Cohen 
(1988). 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the between-participant factor IEF 
was carried out on individual A’ scores averaged per screener across threat 
category. There was a main effect of IEF with a large effect size of η2 = .46, 
F(9, 433) = 41.67, p < .001. 
Figure 2 shows means and standard errors of A’ scores of block 1 broken 
up by IEF and threat category. For all four threat categories, the OR image 
type resulted in the best performance. Again, some IEFs impaired detection 
performance substantially. Moreover, the results in Figure 2 suggest that 
the effects of IEFs on performance vary between threat categories. These 
results were confirmed by a separate ANOVA using individual A’ scores 
calculated for each of the four threat categories (guns, knives, IEDs, other 
prohibited items). The ANOVA with the between-participant factor IEF and 
the within-participant factor threat category gave a large main effect of IEF 
with an effect size of η2 = .48, F(9, 433) = 43.66, p < .001. There was also a 
large main effect of threat type with an effect size of η2 = .30, F(3, 1299) = 
180.84, p < .001. And there was also a large interaction between threat 
category and IEF with η2 = .32, F(27, 1299) = 22.91, p < .001. 
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The same A’ scores were subjected 
to one-way ANOVAs that were 
conducted separately for each 
threat category. There was a large 
main effect of IEF for all threat 
categories. For guns, there was an 
effect size of η2 = .64, F(9, 433) = 
86.09, p < .001, for IEDs η2 = .32, 
F(9, 433) = 22.38, p < .001, for 
knives η2 = .32, F(9, 433) = 23.10, 
p < 001, and for other prohibited 
items η2 = .43, F(9, 433) = 36.27, p 
< .001. 
In short, the OR image type 
resulted in the best performance for 
all threat categories. Moreover, 
some IEFs resulted in a substantial 
impairment which clearly depended 
on threat category. This interaction 
would be predicted if one takes into 
account that color information in x-
ray images represents different 
materials and that different 
prohibited items vary in their 
material composition. For example, 
the Metal Only (MO) filter removes 
organic material from the x-ray 
Figure 2: Detection performance in Experiment 1, block 1, 
broken up by threat category. 
GR = Grayscale, LH = Luminance High, LL = Lumi-nance 
Low, LN = Luminance Negative, MO = Metal Only, MS = 
Metal Stripping, OO = Organic Only, OR = Original, OS = 
Organic Stripping, SE = Super Enhancement. 
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image (see also Table 1). Since guns and knives usually consist of metallic 
material, their pixels in the filtered x-ray image remain largely unaffected 
when the MO filter is used. However, explosive material of IEDs is organic, 
thus it is not surprising that the MO filter results in a large impairment of IED 
detection (see Figure 2). A similar explanation applies to the effect of the 
Organic Stripping (OS) filter. When this filter is applied, all metallic parts of 
the image remain colored and the organic parts are shown in light gray with 
low contrast. The resulting image is similar to the MO image, except that for 
this filter the mixed organic/metallic pixels are still green. Since the Metal 
Stripping (MS) filter removes metallic information from the image, this IEF 
results in a substantial impairment of the detection of guns and knives, 
which usually contain much metal. Because organic explosive material in 
IEDs remains visible when the MS filter is used, IED detection is not 
affected substantially. The results in Figure 2 also indicate that the MS filter 
might be a better option than the Organic Only (OO) filter. As explained in 
Table 1, the MS filter includes information about organic material hidden 
behind metallic parts, whereas the OO filter simply removes these parts 
from the image. A comparison between the original image (OR) and the 
grayscale version gives some indications on the relevance of color 
information. The removal of the color-coded material information by the 
Grayscale filter (GR) does impair threat detection, while this effect is less 
pronounced for the detection of guns. Apparently, the luminance 
information seems to be more important than the material information. 
When inserting a threat object into a bag, the part of the bag with the object 
inside normally becomes darker than its surrounding. This is particularly the 
case for guns which contain much metallic material. Note however, that the 
removal of material information can conceal objects with the same 
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luminance but different material than its surrounding. A similar problem 
appears when using the Super Enhancement (SE) filter. For this IEF, the 
material information remains the same, but the luminance contrast is 
slightly reduced which has a negative influence on detection performance. 
The Luminance High (LH) filter allows better threat detection than the 
Luminance Low (LL) filter. With the LL filter, most objects inside the bag 
have a luminance close to black, which generally reduces the differentiation 
of these objects. When using the Luminance Negative (LN) filter, material 
and luminance information remain in the image, but the luminance is 
inverted. The impairment of threat detection when using this IEF shows that 
screeners perform better with a dark object on a light background than if the 
luminance is inverted. 
The results reported so far refer to block 1. As explained in the method 
section above, all participants conducted the X-Ray CAT again in block 2 
using the original image type (OR). This was conducted to confirm post-hoc 
that the different participant groups are equivalent in terms of their x-ray 
image interpretation competency. This a prerequisite for the interpretation 
of the results reported above involving ANOVAs with IEF as between-
participant factor. Separate ANOVAs of the data from block 2 confirmed 
that the 9 experimental groups and the control group were equivalent. 
Individual A’ scores were calculated for each screener based on all trials of 
block 2. These data were subjected to a one-way ANOVA with participant 
group as between-participant factor. All groups were equivalent, since there 
was no effect of group, η2 = .02, F(9, 433) = 1.08, p = .38. Individual A’ 
scores were calculated also for each threat category separately and this 
data were then analysed using an ANOVA with participant group as 
between-participant factor and threat category as within-participant factor. 
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Again, the results show that the participant groups were equivalent in terms 
of their x-ray image interpretation competency, since there was no main 
effect of participant group, and no interaction between participant group and 
threat category, η2 = .02, F(9, 433) = 1.04, p = .41, and η2 = .02, F(27, 433) 
= 0.86, p = .63, respectively. 
2.1.5 Experiment 2 
In hold baggage screening (HBS) x-ray images feature slightly different 
colors. Figure 3 shows examples of the stimuli used in Experiment 2. As 
explained in the introduction, screeners mainly search for IEDs, as other 
threat objects like for example knives do not pose a threat to the aircraft 
and passengers when placed in hold baggage. HBS screeners are often 
also more experienced screeners as it was the case in this participant 
sample. The main aims of Experiment 2 were to examine whether similar 
results are found in HBS regarding the effect of IEFs despite the operational 
and training differences between HBS and CBS. 
 
        Figure 3: IEFs for HBS as used in Experiment 2. From top  
        left to bottom right: GR, LN, OO, OR, OS, SE (see Table 1). 
 
2.1.5.1  Participants 
Data of 83 aviation security screeners of the HBS of the same European 
airport was analyzed. As in Experiment 1, a between-subjects design was 
OR
GR LN OO
OS SE
21 
 
used to compare the effect of the IEFs. Due to the smaller sample size only 
5 IEFs and the OR image could be tested. The 83 HBS screeners were 
randomly assigned to one of five experimental groups (GR, LN, OO, OR, 
OS, SE filters) or the control group (OR filter). The assignment of 
participants to groups was conducted so that the distribution of gender, age, 
and days on job was equal across groups. The six groups showed an equal 
average of detection performance A’, which was calculated using data of a 
separate test conducted prior to this study. The number of screeners in 
each experimental group were between 10 (GR) and 17 (OO); the control 
group (OR) consisted of 15 screeners. As in Experiment 1, the difference in 
the group sizes is due to missing values (i.e. incomplete tests) for several 
screeners. 
2.1.5.2  Method and Procedure 
The Bomb Detection Test (BDT) was used in this study. This computer-
based test contains 200 x-ray images of real hold baggage, whereas 100 
images contain an IED. The IEDs were created by police experts. 
Participants were instructed to decide for each x-ray image whether it is OK 
(does not contain an IED) or NOT OK (contains an IED). Images 
disappeared after 10 seconds. As in Experiment 1, there were two blocks. 
In block 1, each of the 5 experimental groups was tested with their 
respective IEF. In block 2 all participants were then tested again using the 
same images but using the Original (OR) image function. The control group 
conducted the test twice using the OR image type in block 1 and block 2. 
As in Experiment 1, the purpose of block 2 was to confirm the comparability 
of the groups post hoc. 
 
22 
 
2.1.6 Results and Discussion 
Analyses were similar to Experiment 1 but there was only one threat 
category, i.e. IEDs. Figure 4 shows means and standard errors of A’ scores 
broken up by image enhancement function. As mentioned above, A’ scores 
are not shown in the figure for security reasons. Effect sizes are calculated 
using effect size analysis and they are interpreted based on Cohen (1988). 
A one-way ANOVA with IEF as between-participant factor revealed a large 
main effect of IEF with an effect size of η2 = .26, F(5, 77) = 5.29, p < .001. 
As in Experiment 1, the original image (OR) resulted in the best 
performance. Consistent with the results found in Experiment 1, we found in 
Experiment 2 that the Organic Stripping (OS) and Luminance Negative (LN) 
functions resulted in a substantial impairment of detection performance for 
IEDs.  
 
All participants conducted the test again in block 2 using the original image 
type (OR). The aim was to confirm post-hoc that the different participant 
groups are equivalent in terms of their x-ray image interpretation 
competency. To this end, individual A’ scores from block 2 were subjected 
to a one-way ANOVA with participant group as between-participant factor. 
There was no main effect of group, η2 = .05, F(5, 77) = 0.75, p = .59, 
Figure 4: Detection performance Experiment 2, block 1. GR 
= Grayscale, LN = Luminance Negative, OO = Organic 
Only, OR = Original, OS = Organic Stripping, SE = Super 
Enhancement. 
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confirming that the six groups are equivalent regarding their x-ray image 
interpretation competency.  
 
2.1.7 General Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of image enhancement 
functions (IEFs) on x-ray detection performance of airport security 
screeners. Experiment 1 was conducted with cabin baggage and 
Experiment 2 with hold baggage. In both experiments the original image 
(OR) resulted in the best performance. One interpretation could be that for 
this manufacturer the default image is indeed the best image. However, 
since the OR image is the default image on the tested x-ray machine and 
since screeners received more training with OR images, further research is 
needed to clarify whether the benefit of the OR image type is due to 
expertise and training or whether it truly reflects better image quality. In 
both experiments, it was also found that some IEFs resulted in substantial 
impairments of detection performance. This general result is consistent with 
previous reports (Klock, 2005; Schwaninger, 2005b). The IEF effects are 
dependent on threat category; most likely due to differences in material 
properties of the different threat categories. For example, guns contain 
more metal than IEDs. Removing metallic content (MS function) therefore 
results in a larger impairment of detection performance for guns than for 
IEDs. 
The main conclusions of this study are that user testing is crucial before 
implementing such filters into a system. Moreover, training when and how 
to use each of the filters is crucial to make effective use of them. We are 
conducting a set of additional experiments to further investigate the value of 
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IEFs. For example, it could be that although on average certain IEFs impair 
detection, they could still be useful for detecting certain threat objects under 
certain conditions. Moreover, we are currently looking at CBT data where 
screeners have the possibility to choose a filter and to switch between 
filters. This allows investigating whether perhaps a certain combination and 
sequence of IEFs is useful for certain threat types and images. In addition, 
we are trying to clarify, whether IEFs actually do not improve detection of 
prohibited items or if however, when used according to individual 
preferences and to specific features of the image, they can improve the 
ability to locate targets. Finally, we also have implemented IEFs in a CBT 
system (X-Ray Tutor) to investigate potentially supporting effects that only 
can become manifest through training and familiarization. 
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3 Automated Image Difficulty Estimation 
3.1 Towards a Model for Estimating Image Difficulty in X-Ray 
Screening 
3.1.1 Abstract 
In this study we developed a first computational model for estimating image 
difficulty of x-ray images of passenger bags. Based on Schwaninger (2003) 
three image-based factors are proposed as predictors of image difficulty: 
view difficulty of the threat item, superposition by other objects, and bag 
complexity (i.e. clutter and transparency of the bag). First, these factors 
were validated using detection experiments. We then developed computer-
based algorithms to estimate the image-based factors automatically. 
Finally, we could show that our computational model can better explain 
human performance than human ratings of the image-based factors. 
3.1.2 Introduction 
The relevance of aviation security has increased dramatically in the last 
years. One of the most important tasks is the visual inspection of passenger 
bags using x-ray machines. In this study we investigated the role of image-
based factors on human detection of prohibited items in x-ray images. 
Schwaninger (2003) has proposed in that the following image-based factors 
influence how difficult it is to detect a threat item in x-ray images: view 
difficulty of the threat item, superposition by other objects, and bag 
complexity. This was validated in a study conducted by Schwaninger, 
Hardmeier & Hofer (2004). In Experiment 1, we replicated these results in 
order to provide converging evidence for the validity of the assumption of 
different image-based factors. In Experiment 2, the same x-ray images 
were rated by human participants for view difficulty, superposition, bag 
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complexity (clutter and transparency), and general difficulty. These human 
ratings were then correlated with detection performance obtained in the first 
experiment. In Experiment 3, we developed computer-based algorithms to 
estimate the image-based factors automatically. These estimates were 
correlated with human ratings of the same image-based factors (obtained in 
Experiment 2). Using multiple linear regression analysis, we examined in 
Experiment 4 whether our computer-based estimates were able to predict 
human performance from Experiment 1 as good as human ratings from 
Experiment 2 on the same image-based factors could do so. 
3.1.3 Experiment 1 
The main aim of Experiment 1 was to replicate the results of Schwaninger, 
Hardmeier & Hofer (2004), in which it was shown that view difficulty, 
superposition, and bag complexity influence detection performance 
substantially. 
3.1.4 Method and Procedure 
3.1.4.1  Participants 
Twelve undergraduates of the University of Zurich participated in this study 
(5 males, 7 females). None of them had participated in a study with x-ray 
images before. 
3.1.4.2  Procedure 
The Object Recognition Test (ORT) was used to analyze the influence of 
the three image-based factors view difficulty, superposition and bag 
complexity on human detection performance (for details see Schwaninger, 
Hardmeier & Hofer (2004) and Hardmeier, Hofer & Schwaninger (2005). X-
ray images of passenger bags were shown 4 seconds each. Participants 
had to decide whether a bag is OK (no threat item present) or NOT OK 
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(threat item present). Using a slider control, participants indicated on a 90 
point rating scale how sure they were in their decision (confidence ratings). 
There were a total of 256 test trials: 16 (8 guns, 8 knives) x 2 (easy vs. 
difficult view) x 2 (low vs. high superposition) x 2 (low vs. high bag 
complexity) x 2 (threat bag vs. harmless bag). No feedback was given on 
test trials. Prior to the test trials, 8 practice trials were presented followed by 
a presentation of the threat items. The 8 guns were shown for 10 seconds 
followed by a 10 second screen with the 8 knives. Half of the items were 
shown in easy view, the other half in difficult view (for further details see 
Schwaninger, Hardmeier & Hofer, 2004; Hardmeier, Hofer & Schwaninger, 
2005). 
3.1.4.3  Statistical Analysis 
In the study conducted by Schwaninger, Hardmeier & Hofer (2004) 
detection was measured using A’ (for details on this and other detection 
measures see Green & Sweets, 1996; Hofer & Schwaninger, 2004. In this 
study, we were interested in developing a computational model to explain 
detection performance of threats in x-ray images. In Experiment 1 we 
calculated hit rates for each participant by averaging across threat images. 
Individual hit rates were subjected to a three-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with view difficulty, superposition and bag complexity as within-
participant factors. 
 
3.1.5 Results and Discussion 
The main effects are illustrated in Figure 5. All were highly significant with 
large effect sizes (η2 values). View difficulty: η2 = .95, F(1,11) = 211.2, p < 
.001; superposition: η2 = .49, F (1,11) = 10.5, p < .01; bag complexity: η2 = 
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.59, F(1,11) = 16.0, p < .01. This 
replicates earlier findings in which 
large main effects of view, 
superposition and bag complexity 
were found for A’ scores 
(Schwaninger et al., 2004). 
Only one significant interaction was found: Bag complexity * view difficulty: 
η2 = .77, F(1,11) = 36.4, p < .001. All other interactions were not significant. 
This is consistent with the assumption of three relatively independent 
factors (whereas only view difficulty and bag complexity might interact). 
 
3.1.6 Experiment 2 
3.1.6.1  Introduction 
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether human ratings of 
view difficulty, superposition and bag complexity are correlated with human 
performance measured in Experiment 1. 
3.1.7 Method and Procedure 
3.1.7.1  Participants 
The same participants of Experiment 1 took part in Experiment 2 (with a 
delay of about one week). 
3.1.7.2  Procedure 
The same x-ray images as in Experiment 1 were used. The participant’s 
task was to rate view difficulty and superposition of the threat items (threat 
bags only), and clutter, transparency and general image difficulty (threat 
and non-threat bags). Ratings were given using a graphical slider control 
Figure 5: Illustration of main effects of view difficulty,
superposition and bag complexity on hit rates for guns.
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(from very low = 0 to very high = 50). Prior to the ratings, 8 practice trials 
were presented. 
3.1.7.3  Statistical Analysis 
Hit rates per x-ray image were calculated by averaging performance data 
from Experiment 1 across participants. These hit rates were then correlated 
with x-ray image ratings on threat bags from Experiment 2 (per image, 
averaged across participants). 
3.1.8 Results and Discussion 
Pearson correlations showed that ratings of view difficulty and superposition 
were significantly correlated with hit rate, r(64) = -.521, p < .001, and r(64) = 
-.522, p < .001, respectively. The other correlations did not reach statistical 
significance: Hit rate and clutter, r(64) = -.17, p = .19; hit rate and 
transparency, r(64) = .08, p = .56. These results could suggest that both 
clutter and transparency are not relevant for the detection of the threat 
items used in this study (only guns, see introduction), or that the 
participants could not reliably estimate the degree of clutter and 
transparency. We are currently conducting further research to investigate 
these possibilities. 
3.1.9 Experiment 3 
3.1.10 Introduction 
In Experiment 3, computer-based estimates for image-based factors were 
developed. They were compared to human ratings from Experiment 2 in 
order to determine their perceptual plausibility. The following table shows 
the abbreviations for all independent variables. 
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Independent 
Variables 
Computer-
based 
Estimates 
Rating 
Estimates
View Difficulty VDC VDR 
Superposition SPC SPR 
Clutter CLC CLR 
Transparency TRC TRR 
 
3.1.11 Method and Procedure 
3.1.11.1 Computer based estimates 
Computer-based estimates were developed for view difficulty, 
superposition, and bag complexity (i.e. clutter and transparency). 
3.1.11.2 View Difficulty 
View difficulty VD was calculated 
by averaging hit rates (pHiti) across 
different threat images displaying the same threat item view. In the ORT, 
each threat item is displayed 4 times from the same viewpoint (see section 
3.1.4.2.). The detection performance of the item in question (pHitj) was 
excluded from this average detection performance. This was done in order 
to avoid a circular argument in the statistical model by partial inclusion of a 
predictor into the criterion variable. Therefore, the n in the view difficulty 
formula equals 4, but the average was calculated over the remaining three 
(n-1) images displaying the same threat item view. 
View Difficulty VDj =
pHiti
i=1
n∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ − pHit j
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
n −1Formula 1
Table 2: Abbreviations used in this article. Indices C 
and R represent computer-based and human rating 
estimates, respectively. 
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3.1.11.3 Superposition 
The computer-based estimate of 
superposition is based on the 
Euclidian distance between the grayscale pixel intensities of the bag with 
the threat item (ISN) and the bag without it (IN). The following formula was 
used: 
3.1.11.4 Clutter 
Clutter (CL) should represent the 
amount of disarrangement in the 
bag. In our approach it was 
estimated based on the amount of high pass frequency information: 
This convolution ( ⊗) is equivalent to a high-pass Butterworth filter 
application in the Fourier-space (F-1: inverse Fourier transform), where fx 
and fy are the frequency components, f is the cut-off frequency and d the fall 
off. 
3.1.11.5 Transparency 
Metallic content is more difficult to 
penetrate by x-ray than organic 
material, which therefore appears 
more “transparent” or less opaque in the x-ray image. Transparency was 
estimated based on the number of pixels in the darkest quarter (< 65) of the 
pixel intensity range (0 to 255), relative to the bags overall size (areas with 
pixel intensities ≠ 255). 
Transparency TR =
(IN (x,y) < 65)
x,y
∑
(IN (x,y) ≠ 255)
x,y
∑
Formula 4
d
yx
yx
yxN
f
ff
ffHP
ffHPFyxICLClutter
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛ ++
−=
⊗= −∑
)(
1
11),(
))),((),((
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Formula 3 
Superposition SP = (ISN (x, y) − IN (x, y))2∑Formula 2
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3.1.11.6 Statistical Analysis 
To examine the perceptual plausibility of the computer-based estimates we 
calculated their correlations with the corresponding human ratings from 
Experiment 2. 
3.1.12 Results and Discussion 
As can be seen on the diagonal of the correlation matrix of Table 3, all 
correlations between computer-based 
estimates and human ratings were 
highly significant (except for clutter). 
This shows that at least three of the 
four of our computer-based estimates 
of image-based factors are perceptually 
plausible. The high correlation between 
computer-based estimates of 
transparency and human ratings for 
clutter could indicate that our 
participants had problems in 
distinguishing between clutter and transparency. This is consistent with the 
high correlation between human ratings of clutter and transparency, r(64) = 
-.79, p < .001. 
 
 
 
  VDR SPR CLR TRR
VDC -.61** -.32** -.06 -.00
SPC -.22 -.44** -.28* .15 
CLC -.04 .12 .15 -.10
TRC -.03 .32** .67** -.62**
*p<.05. **p<.01     
Table 3: Correlations between computer-based 
estimates and human ratings. 
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3.1.13 Experiment 4 
3.1.14 Introduction 
The aim of this experiment was to examine how well our computer-based 
estimates can explain human performance. 
3.1.15 Method and Procedure 
Multiple linear regression analysis was used to test how well our computer-
based estimates of image-based factors can explain human performance 
measured in Experiment 1. The human ratings from Experiment 2 were 
used for benchmarking. More specifically, we tested whether our computer-
based estimates of image-based factors achieve a better prediction of 
human performance than human ratings of the same image-based factors. 
3.1.15.1 Statistical Analysis 
The two equations below show the two multiple linear regression models 
using computer-based estimates (C indices) and human ratings (R indices) 
of image-based factors. The abbreviation DP represents detection 
performance (hit rate per image averaged across participants), which is the 
dependent variable. The two models were compared in terms of their 
goodness-of-fit measures, their regression coefficient’s significances, and – 
most importantly – the percentage of variance in the dependent variable the 
models were able to explain. 
DP = b0 + b1VDC + b2SPC + b3CLC + b4TRC + R 
DP = b0 + b1VDR + b2SPR + b3CLR + b4TRR + R 
3.1.16 Results and Discussion 
Note that the scales of the computer-based estimates and the rated image 
based factors have opposite signs. Therefore, the beta-weights in predicting 
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the dependent variable (hit rate per image) have opposite signs in the 
computational and the rating models. 
3.1.17  Computational Model  
The computational model correlates with human performance with r = .76 
(Figure 6). As shown at the bottom of Table 4, our model using computer-
based estimates is able to explain 55 % of the variance of the hit rate 
(adjusted R2). 
Interestingly, view difficulty and superposition explain most of the variance 
of the hit rate. In fact, only their beta weights are significant (Table 4).  
     
           R2 = .581, R2(adj) = .553, F(4,59) = 20.455,  
            p < 0.001; *p < .05. **p <.01. 
 
3.1.17.1 Human Ratings Model 
The model based on human ratings correlates with human performance 
with r = .70 (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
Variable B SE B β   
VDC 0.78 0.10 .68**   
SPC 0.02 0.01 .23*   
CLC -0.00 0.00 -.01   
TRC -0.08 0.45 -.02   
Table 4: Summary of regression analysis using computer-based
estimates of image-based factors for predicting hit rates. 
Figure 6: Correlation between predicted
and observed performance using the
computational model. 
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As can be seen at the bottom of Table 5, the human ratings were able to 
explain 45 % of the variance of the hit rate (adjusted R2). This means, that 
our computational model could explain human performance better than a 
model based on human ratings. Interestingly, for both models, view difficulty 
and superposition explained most of the variance of the hit rate and the 
beta weights of clutter and transparency were not significant. 
3.1.18 General Discussion 
This study provided converging evidence for the view that detection 
performance in x-ray screening depends on view difficulty, superposition 
and bag complexity (Schwaninger, 2003). The results of Experiment 1 
showed large main effects of these image-based factors on human 
detection performance, which is highly consistent with earlier findings by 
Schwaninger (2003). Human ratings (Experiment 2) and computer-based 
estimates (Experiment 3) were significantly correlated for view difficulty and 
superposition. Using multiple regression it was shown in Experiment 4 that 
our computational model could explain human performance (hit rate) better 
than a model based on human ratings. Interestingly, for both models, view 
difficulty and superposition explained most of the variance of the hit rate. In 
contrast, bag complexity (clutter and transparency) was a weak predictor for 
R2 = .485, R2(adj) = .452, F(4,59) = 14.004,  
p < 0.001; *p < .05. **p < .01. 
Table 5: Summary of regression analysis using human 
ratings of image-based factors for predicting hit rates. 
Variable B SE B β 
VDR -0.01 0.00 -.46** 
SPR -0.02 0.00 -.48** 
CLR -0.00 0.00 -.05 
TRR -0.01 0.01 -.11 
 
Figure 7: Correlation between predicted and 
observed performance using the human ratings 
model. 
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both, the model based on human ratings, as well as the computational 
model. As explained in the introduction, only results from guns are 
presented in this study. We are currently conducting a series of 
experiments using different threat types and computer-based estimates in 
order to extend the computational model presented in this paper and to 
further investigate the role of bag complexity. 
3.1.19 Acknowledgment 
We are thankful to Zurich State Police, Airport Divison and Zurich Airport 
Unique for supporting this study.  
3.1.20 References 
Schwaninger, A. (2003). Evaluation and selection of airport security screeners. 
AIRPORT, 02/2003, 14-15. 
Schwaninger, A., Hardmeier, D., & Hofer, F. (2004). Measuring visual abilities and visual 
knowledge of aviation security screeners. IEEE ICCST Proceedings, 38, 258-264. 
Hardmeier, D., Hofer, F., & Schwaninger, A. (2005). The x-ray object recognition test (x- 
ray ort) – a reliable and valid instrument for measuring visual abilities needed in x-
ray screening. IEEE ICCST Proceedings, 39, 189-192.  
Green, D.M. & Sweets, J.A. (1996). Signal detection theory and psychophysics, New  
York: Wiley. 
Hofer, F. & Schwaninger, A. (2004). Reliable and valid measures of threat detection 
performance in X-ray screening. IEEE ICCST Proceedings, 38, 303-308. 
 
  
38 
 
4 How to Increase X-ray Image Interpretation with Computer-
Based Training 
4.1 Investigating Training and Transfer Effects Resulting 
from Recurrent CBT of X-Ray Image Interpretation 
4.1.1 Abstract 
The importance of airport security has increased dramatically in the last 
years. Large investments into x-ray screening technology have been made 
in order to cope with the changed terrorist threat situation. However, the 
most expensive equipment is of limited value if the humans who operate it 
are not trained well enough to detect threat objects in x-ray images of 
passenger bags quickly and reliably. In this study we investigated whether 
adaptive computer based training (CBT) can be used to increase x-ray 
image interpretation competency of airport security screeners. To this end, 
we tested screeners before and after six months of weekly recurrent CBT 
using X-Ray Tutor (XRT). A control group of screeners was tested as well 
but this group did not receive training with XRT. Large increases in 
detection performance were found for the training group, which did also 
generalize to new threat objects that were not shown during training. The 
results of this study indicate that recurrent CBT can be a powerful tool to 
increase the x-ray image interpretation competency of screeners. 
4.1.2 Introduction 
In recent years, x-ray screening of passenger bags has become an 
essential component of airport security. Large investments were made into 
state-of-the art x-ray screening equipment. However, well trained human 
screeners are needed to operate the equipment appropriately in order to 
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detect threat objects in passenger luggage within few seconds of inspection 
time. Object shapes that are not similar to ones stored in visual memory are 
difficult to recognize (e.g., Graf, Schwaninger, Wallraven, & Bülthoff, 2002; 
Schwaninger, 2004, 2005). Thus, a prerequisite for good threat detection 
performance is knowledge about which objects are prohibited and what 
they look like in x-ray images. Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) 
have shown that x-ray screener performance depends on knowledge-based 
and image-based factors. Image-based factors refer to image difficulty 
resulting from viewpoint variation of threat objects, superposition of threat 
objects by other objects in a bag, and bag complexity depending on the 
number and type of objects in the bag. The ability to cope with image-based 
factors is related to individual visual-cognitive abilities rather than a mere 
result of training. In contrast, knowledge-based factors refer to knowing 
which items are prohibited and what they look like in x-ray images of 
passenger bags. Because objects look quite different in x-ray images than 
in reality and because many threat objects are not known from everyday 
experience, computer-based and on the job training are important 
determinants of x-ray detection performance. Schwaninger et al. (2005) 
compared detection performance of novices with the one of trained aviation 
security screeners. A rather poor recognition of unfamiliar object shapes 
(e.g. self-defense gas spray, electric shock device etc.) in x-ray images was 
found for novices. For trained aviation security personnel, a much higher 
recognition performance was shown. Schwaninger and Hofer (2004) 
showed that adaptive computer-based training (CBT) can be very effective 
to increase the detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in x-ray 
images of passenger bags. McCarley, Kramer, Wickens, Vidoni, and Boot 
40 
 
(2004) reported a better performance after training for the detection of 
knives in x-ray images. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate to what extent the previous 
findings can be expanded to other threat categories (e.g., guns and other 
prohibited items) and to examine transfer effects. The training group 
conducted weekly recurrent CBT using X-Ray Tutor (Schwaninger, 2004). 
The control group did not receive this type of training and conducted 
recurrent classroom training including another CBT system. Both groups of 
screeners were tested before and after 6 months using the X-Ray 
Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT, Koller & Schwaninger, 2006). 
This test shows different kinds of prohibited items in x-ray images of 
passenger bags. Half of the threat objects in the X-Ray CAT were not 
presented during the training sessions. This enabled measuring whether a 
transfer of the gained knowledge about trained objects to untrained but 
similar looking objects occurs. 
4.1.3 Method 
4.1.3.1 Participants 
A total of 209 airport security screeners of a European airport participated in 
this study and conducted the X-Ray CAT 1.0.0 two times with an interval of 
six months. The training group consisted of 97 screeners who conducted 
weekly recurrent CBT of about 20 minutes using X-Ray Tutor (XRT) CBS 
2.0 Standard Edition during the 6 months interval between the two test 
measurements. The control group consisted of 112 screeners and they did 
not conduct weekly recurrent CBT with XRT. 
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4.1.3.2  Materials 
The X-Ray CAT consists of 128 x-ray images of passenger bags. Each of 
the bags is used twice, once containing a prohibited item (threat image) and 
once without any threat object (Figure 8 displays an example of the stimuli). 
The threat items belong to four categories of prohibited items as defined in 
Doc 30 of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC): guns, 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), knives and other prohibited items 
(e.g., gas, chemicals, grenades etc.). The threat objects have been 
selected and prepared by experts of Zurich State Police, Airport division to 
be representative and realistic. 
 
             
 
   Figure 8: Example of an x-ray image of a passenger bag. The image on  
   the right contains the prohibited item depicted separately on the bottom right. 
 
For each threat category 16 exemplars are used (8 pairs). Each pair 
consists of two prohibited items that are similar in shape (see Figure 9). 
These were distributed randomly into two sets, set A and set B. 
 
                               
   Figure 9: Example of two x-ray images of similar looking  
   threat objects used in the test, one belonging to set A and B, respectively.  
 
Every item is depicted from two different viewpoints. The easy viewpoint 
shows the object from a canonical perspective (Palmer, Rosch, & Chase, 
1981) as judged by two security experts who captured the stimuli. The 
difficult viewpoint shows the threat item with an 85 degree horizontal 
rotation or an 85 degree vertical rotation relative to the canonical view. In 
+ =
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each threat category half of the prohibited items of the difficult viewpoint are 
rotated vertically, the other half horizontally. Set A and B are equalized 
concerning the rotations of the prohibited objects. The effects of viewpoint 
are not analyzed in this study and will be reported elsewhere. 
Every threat item is combined with a bag in a manner that the degree of 
superposition by other objects is similar for both viewpoints. This was 
achieved using a function that calculates the difference between the pixel 
intensity values of the bag image with the threat object minus the bag 
image without the threat object using the following formula (see also section 
3.1.11.3): 
 
 
 
SP = Superposition; ISN = Grayscale intensity of the SN (Signal plus Noise) image (contains a prohibited 
item); IN = Grayscale intensity of the N (Noise) image (contains no prohibited item); Object Size: Number 
of pixels of the prohibited item where R, G and B are < 253 
 
Using this equation (division by object size), the superposition value is 
independent of the size of the prohibited item. This value can be kept 
relatively constant for the two views of a threat object, independent of the 
degree of clutter in a bag, when combining the bag image and the 
prohibited item. The bag images were visually inspected by aviation 
security experts to ensure they do not contain any other prohibited items. 
Harmless bags were assigned to the different categories and viewpoints of 
the threat objects in a way that their difficulty was balanced across all 
 
ObjectSize
yxIyxI
SP NSN
),(),( −=
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categories1. The false alarm rate (the rate at which screeners wrongly 
judged a harmless bag as containing a threat item) for each bag image 
served as measure of difficulty based on a pilot study with 192 screeners. 
The X-Ray CAT is integrated in the XRT training system and takes about 
20-30 minutes to complete. Each image is shown for a maximum of 10 
seconds on the screen. Screeners have to judge whether the bag is OK 
(contains no prohibited item) or NOT OK (contains a prohibited item). 
Additionally, screeners have to indicate the perceived difficulty of each 
image on a 100 point scale (difficulty rating). The difficulty ratings were not 
analyzed in study and will be reported elsewhere. The visible appearance of 
the test is the same as in training except there is no feedback and 
screeners do not have to click on the image to identify the threat object (see 
Figure 10). Feedback is provided only during training and informs the 
screener whether the image has been judged correctly or not. If the bag 
contains a threat item, it is highlighted by flickering after the screener 
responded with OK or NOT OK and the screener has the possibility to 
display information about the threat item (see Figure 10). As mentioned 
previously, during training, screeners have to click on the image and mark 
the object they perceive to be a threat item. This is not required during test 
mode. 
 
                                                     
1 The eight categories of test images (four threat categories in two viewpoints each) are similar in terms of the 
difficulty of the harmless bags. This means, a difference of detection performance between categories or 
viewpoints cannot be due to differences in the difficulty of the bag images. 
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  Figure 10: Screenshot of the XRT training system during training. At the bottom right a feedback is  
  provided. If a bag contains a threat item, an information window can be displayed (see bottom left of 
  the screen). 
 
 
4.1.4 Procedure 
Screeners were randomly distributed into two groups. Both groups 
conducted the X-Ray CAT 1.0.0 without having trained with XRT before 
(baseline measurement). After test completion, only one group received 
recurrent adaptive CBT using XRT (training group). On average, each 
screener of the training group conducted 20.26 min recurrent training per 
week (SD = 3.65 min). After six months, both groups conducted the X-ray 
CAT again. This approach allows the comparison of the two test 
measurements and the performance of the two groups prior to and after 
training with XRT. 
In order to measure a transfer effect, only the images of the prohibited 
items of test set A were included in training. They are part of the XRT CBS 
2.0 SE training library, which contains 100 threat items belonging to the four 
threat categories (guns, IEDs, knives, other). Most of them are depicted 
from six different viewpoints. No bag image of the test appeared during 
training with XRT. During training, images containing a threat object are 
created at the point of use, that is, test threat items (set A) and other threat 
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items are digitally inserted into randomly selected bag images at random 
positions. For details on XRT see Schwaninger (2004). 
4.1.5 Results 
Detection performance was calculated using the signal detection measure 
d’ (Green & Swets, 1966), which takes into account the hit rate (correctly 
judged threat images as being NOT 
OK) and the false alarm rate (wrongly 
judged harmless bags as being NOT 
OK). Figure 11 shows the detection 
performance of the first and second 
measurement for both screener 
groups. Performance values are not 
reported due to security reasons. 
However, effect sizes are reported for 
all relevant analyses and interpreted based on Cohen (1988), see Table 6. 
 
   Table 6: Classification of effect sizes according to Cohen (1988) 
 
 
 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures using d’ scores 
with the within-participant factor measurement (first vs. second) and the 
between-participant factor group (trained vs. control) revealed a large main 
effect of measurement (first vs. second), η2 = .40, F(1, 207) = 138.66, p < 
.001, a medium main effect of group (trained vs. control), η2 = .13, F(1, 207) 
Figure 11: Detection performance with standard 
deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first and second measurement. 
Effect size d η2
small 0.20 0.01
medium 0.50 0.06
large 0.80 0.14
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= 31.22, p < .001, and a large interaction of measurement and group η2 = 
.34, F(1, 207) = 105.55, p < .001. 
Separate pairwise t-tests of detection performance d’ revealed no 
significant difference at the baseline measurement between the two groups 
(p = .353) and no significant difference for the control group in both 
measurements (p = .108). However, there was a significant difference for 
the XRT training group between the first and the second measurement (p < 
.001) with a large effect size of d = 1.39. There was also a significant 
difference between the two groups at the second measurement, p < .001, 
with a large effect size of d = 1.27. 
Figure 12 shows the detection performance for each threat category 
separately for both groups at the first and the second measurement. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-participant factors 
measurement (first vs. second) and threat category (guns, IEDs, knives and 
other), and the between-participant factor group (XRT training vs. control) 
revealed the main effects and 
interactions given in Table 2a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Separate pairwise t-tests were conducted to compare detection 
performance at the first and the second measurement for both groups and 
each threat category separately. The XRT training group showed a 
Figure 12: Detection performance with standard 
deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first and second measurement for 
each threat category separately. 
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significant increase of the detection performance at the second 
measurement for each threat category (guns, IEDs and other threat objects, 
all p < 001, all d > 0.60, knives, p < .05, d = 0.26). Detection performance of 
the control group did not differ significantly between the two measurements 
(guns: p = .358, IEDs: p = .296, knives: p = .467, and other threat objects: p 
= .168). 
The results of the analysis considering the two sets of the test, set A and 
set B, are shown in Figures 13 and 14. The results of the repeated 
measures ANOVA with the within-participant factors measurement (first vs. 
second) and test set (A vs. B) and the between-participant factor group 
(XRT training group vs. control group) can be seen in Table 7b. Pairwise t-
tests showed a significant increase in detection performance at the second 
measurement for both sets for the XRT training group (set A and B: p < 
.001, d > 1.25) but not for the control group. 
   Table 7: Results of the ANOVAs 
 
Factor df F η2 p
Measurement (M) 1, 207 140.23 0.40 <.001
Threat Category (T) 3, 621 222.7 0.52 <.001
Group (G) 1, 207 37.57 0.15 <.001
M x G 1, 207 108.16 0.34 <.001
T x G 3, 621 29.36 0.12 <.001
M x T 3, 621 76.5 0.27 <.001
M x T x G 3, 621 74.78 0.27 <.001
Measurement (M) 1, 207 138.39 0.40 <.001
Group (G) 1, 207 32.64 0.14 <.001
Test Set (S) -- -- -- n.s.
M x G 1, 207 104.08 0.34 <.001
M x S 1, 207 8.72 0.04 <.01
S x G 1, 207 17.31 0.08 <.001
M x S x G 1, 207 7.92 0.04 <.01
Measurement (M) 1, 207 146.15 0.41 <.001
Threat Category (T) 3, 621 219.54 0.52 <.001
Group (G) 1, 207 42.53 0.17 <.001
M x G 1, 207 108.68 0.34 <.001
T x G 3, 621 30.29 0.13 <.001
M x T 3, 621 78.18 0.27 <.001
M x S 1, 207 10.17 0.05 <.01
T x S 3, 621 58.12 0.22 <.001
M x T x G 3, 621 75.51 0.27 <.001
M x S x G 1, 207 6.67 0.02 <.05
a)
b)
c)
48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 13: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training  
  group vs. the control group comparing first and second measurement for set A and 
  set B separately. 
 
An ANOVA for repeated measures with the within-participant factor set 
showed a very small significant main effect of set η2 = .02, F(1, 208) = 3.94, 
p < .05 at the first measurement. Pairwise t-tests comparing both sets 
within one group at the first measurement revealed a significant difference 
of the two sets only for the control group with only a small effect size (p < 
.01, d = 0.17) but not for the XRT training group (p = .676). 
An extended ANOVA with the additional within-participant factor threat 
category revealed the main effects and interactions as specified in Table 
7c. 
Pairwise t-tests confirmed a significant (p < 001, all d > 0.46) increase in 
detection performance for the XRT training group for all threat categories 
per set except for knives (set A: p < .05, d = 0.27, set B; p = .127, d = 0.19). 
The control group showed no significant change in detection performance 
at the second measurement for neither threat category per set (set A: guns 
p = .147, IEDs p = .202, knives p = .801, other threat objects p = .245; set 
B: guns p = .974, IEDs p = .597, knives p = .235, other threat objects p = 
.123). 
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Figure 14: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control group comparing 
first and second measurement for set A and set B and each threat category separately. 
 
4.1.6 Discussion 
The results of this study confirmed earlier findings on x-ray detection 
performance of airport security screeners showing that adaptive CBT with 
X-Ray Tutor (XRT) results in substantial increases of detection performance 
(e.g., Hardmeier, Hofer, & Schwaninger, 2006; Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004; 
Schwaninger et al., 2005). In this study, the training group showed 
remarkable increases in detection performance for all types of threat 
objects (guns, knives, IEDs, and other prohibited items). For the control 
group, which did not conduct weekly recurrent CBT with XRT, no significant 
change in detection performance was observed. It should be noted that 
according to the security organization and their appropriate authority, the 
control group did recurrent training as mandated by national regulation 
during the whole duration of the study. This training was comparable in 
terms of the required training hours and included x-ray image interpretation 
training using another commercially available CBT. Thus, the improved 
performance in the training group reflects specific effects of training with 
XRT and they cannot be explained by a "Hawthorne Effect". The largest 
training effect was found for IEDs. It should be noted that as all other 
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stimuli, the IEDs were developed by police experts of Zurich State Police, 
Airport Division. Especially the IEDs were quite sophisticated threat objects 
using components that are often not known to screeners without enhanced 
training in IED detection. Thus it is not surprising that before training, d’ 
scores for IEDs were substantially smaller than for guns. However, after 
training, IED detection of the training group was very good and even slightly 
better than gun detection. This shows that the detection of IEDs is not 
difficult per se, but rather depending on the training of screeners.  
Besides measuring training effects, the main aim of this study was to 
examine whether gained knowledge about trained threat objects can be 
transferred to similar looking objects. Since the X-Ray CAT is composed of 
two comparable sets (set A and set B) this can easily be tested by including 
the threat objects of one set (in this case set A) into the XRT system. A 
large transfer effect would mean a similarly higher detection performance 
after training for both sets. This was confirmed, as Figures 13 and 14 
illustrate. The significant increase of the detection performance for the XRT 
training group was found for the trained test set A as well as for the 
untrained test set B. This implies a large transfer of the acquired knowledge 
about the visual appearance of trained objects (set A) to untrained but 
similar looking objects (set B). The comparison of the two sets A and B at 
the baseline measurement over all screeners showed a slightly significant 
difference (p < .05) indicating that the two sets are not exactly equal in 
terms of image difficulty. But this possible objection to the transfer effect 
can be disapproved with two arguments: first, the effect size is only small 
according to the conventions by Cohen (1988, see also Table 1), and 
second, only the control group showed a significant difference (p < .01) but 
not the XRT training group (p = .676). Therefore, the transfer effect in the 
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results of the XRT training group can be attributed to the training of set A 
only. 
Transfer effects were revealed for all threat categories, i.e. for guns, IEDs 
and other threat objects. For knives, a significant training effect appeared 
only in the trained set A (p < .05) but not in the untrained set B (p = .127). 
Thus, there was no transfer effect for knives from set A to set B. Either the 
knives of the two sets were not similar enough in shape to allow a transfer 
effect, or the small training effect for knives is due to their shape. On one 
hand, knives show less diagnostic features which play an important role in 
object recognition compared to objects from other categories. On the other 
hand, the visual similarity of knives to harmless everyday objects (e.g., pen) 
is substantial. These factors could impede detectability and trainability and 
ultimately might have resulted in small transfer effects. 
Contrary to our results, Smith, Redford, Gent, and Washburn (2005) found 
a large decrease in screeners’ detection performance when specific trained 
objects were replaced with new images belonging to the same categories 
(see also Smith, Redford, Washburn, and Taglialatela, 2005). According to 
these authors, improvement in screening performance is attributable only to 
specific-token familiarity that developed for the original images and not to a 
category generalization. They state constraints on categorization and the 
use of category-general information when humans face visual complexity 
and have to identify targets within it. Our results can be interpreted in 
support of generalization of visual learning in x-ray image interpretation. 
However, it might be possible that the objects of the untrained set in our 
study are so similar to the trained objects that a specific-token familiarity led 
to the detection performance increase and not a true generalization effect. 
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The lacking transfer effect in knives would along these lines mean that the 
objects in set A and set B are not similar enough in shape to generate a 
specific-token familiarity. Therefore only the learnt objects could generate a 
training effect but not the unlearnt ones. For Schwaninger and Hofer’s 
(2004) findings of a large increase in detection performance of IEDs after 
recurrent CBT with other members of the category than those included in 
the test, it would mean, that those objects were very similar in order to 
create a specific-token familiarity and therefore a training effect. 
For our future studies, it could also be interesting to increase the interval 
between the end of training and the testing of training transfer, as 
corresponding literature usually tests transfer of training after a 
considerable period of time in order to measure the stability of the transfer 
(e.g., Saks & Belcourt, 2006). However, most research is about 
organizational training and therefore training transfer is related to learning 
working skills and the generalization to the job context (Baldwin & Ford, 
1988). In contrast our transfer refers to the transfer of visual knowledge 
about objects to other objects. 
In any case, our findings show that the knowledge about the visual 
appearance of forbidden objects, which airport security screeners acquire 
during recurrent CBT, can be transferred to similar looking, but not 
previously seen objects. Thus, adaptive CBT can be a powerful tool to 
increase screeners’ x-ray image interpretation competency. 
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4.2 Computer-based training increases efficiency in x-ray image 
interpretation by aviation security screeners 
4.2.1 Abstract  
X-Ray screening of passenger bags is an essential component of airport 
security.  Large investments into technology have been made in recent 
years.  However, the most expensive equipment is of limited value, if the 
humans who operate it are not selected and trained appropriately.  
Scientific studies have shown that human performance in x-ray image 
interpretation depends critically on individual abilities and visual knowledge 
acquired through experience on the job and training.  The aim of this study 
was to investigate the effect of adaptive computer-based training for 
increasing the detection of guns, knives, improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs), and other prohibited items.  97 airport security screeners of a 
European airport participated in this study.  At the beginning of the project, 
all airport security screeners conducted the X-Ray Competency 
Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT).  Thereupon they received adaptive 
computer-based training (CBT) for about 4 months. Then they conducted 
the X-Ray CAT the second time in the middle of the project.  This was 
followed by about 4 months of CBT and a third test with X-Ray CAT at the 
end of the project.  The goal was that each screener conducts at least one 
20 minute training session per week.  Substantial increases of detection 
performance were found as a result of training, which depended on the 
threat category (guns, IEDs, knives and other prohibited items).  The largest 
training effects were found for IEDs.  Additional analyses showed that 
training not only leads to an increase of detection performance but also 
results in faster response times when an x-ray image contains a threat 
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object.  Thus, recurrent CBT can be a powerful tool to increase efficiency in 
x-ray image interpretation by airport security screeners. 
4.2.2 Introduction 
In response to the increasing threat of terrorist attacks, large investments 
were made into x-ray screening machines of the newest generation in order 
to inspect passenger baggage at airport security checkpoints.  The last 
decision however is always made by a human operator (screener).  The 
most expensive equipment is of little value if the screeners who operate it 
are not selected and trained appropriately.  They have to be able to detect 
threat objects in passenger luggage within few seconds of inspection time. 
Object shapes that are not similar to ones stored in visual memory are 
difficult to recognize (Graf,  Schwaninger, Wallraven & Bülthoff, 2002; 
Schwaninger, 2004a; Schwaninger 2004b). Detection of forbidden objects 
in x-ray images of passenger baggage depends on knowledge-based as 
well as on image based factors (Schwaninger, Hardmeier & Hofer, 2005).  
An airport security screener has to know which objects are prohibited and 
what they look like in an x-ray image.  Some objects look quite different in 
x-ray images than in reality, for example an electric shock device.  Other 
threat objects, like improvised explosive devices (IEDs), are rarely seen, in 
every day life as well as at the security checkpoint.  Thus, it is not surprising 
that computer-based training (CBT) is very important to achieve and 
maintain a high detection performance, which is of special importance for 
detecting IEDs (Hardmeier, Hofer & Schwaninger, 2006; Schwaninger & 
Hofer, 2004).  Furthermore, threat objects can be depicted in an unfamiliar 
rotation in the baggage which can have a big impact on the detection 
performance.  Based on research findings from object recognition by 
Schwaninger (2004) a large and representative image library of prohibited 
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items depicted from different viewpoints is necessary to provide a good 
basis for training x-ray image interpretation competency.  In addition to 
knowledge based factors, also image based factors play an important role.  
These can rather be attributed to the visual abilities of a person, that is, to 
the abilities to cope with image difficulty resulting from rotation of a threat 
object, superposition by other objects in the bag, and bag complexity 
(Schwaninger, Hardmeier &. Hofer, 2005; Hardmeier, Hofer & Schwaninger, 
2005; Hardmeier, Hofer & Schwaninger, 2006; Hofer, Hardmeier & 
Schwaninger, 2006; Schwaninger, 2003). 
A comparison of the detection performance of novice screeners with the 
one of trained aviation security screeners in an earlier study revealed a 
rather poor recognition of unfamiliar object shapes (e.g. self-defence gas 
spray, electric shock device etc.) in x-ray images for novices, whereas for 
trained aviation security personnel a much higher recognition performance 
was shown (Schwaninger, Hardmeier & Hofer, 2005).  Schwaninger & 
Hofer (2004) showed that adaptive CBT can be very effective to increase 
the detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in x-ray images of 
passenger bags.  McCarley, Kramer, Wickens, Vidoni & Boot (2004) 
reported a better performance after training for the detection of knives in x-
ray images. 
4.2.3 Method and Procedure 
The aim of this research project was to investigate to what extent recurrent 
adaptive CBT using X-Ray Tutor increases x-ray image interpretation 
competency.  97 airport security screeners of a European airport 
participated in this study.  At the beginning of the project all airport security 
screeners conducted the X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray 
CAT, Koller & Schwaninger, 2006).  Thereupon they received training for 
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about 4 months, then conducted the X-Ray CAT a second time in the 
middle of the project.  This was followed by about 4 months of training and 
a third test with X-Ray CAT at the end of the project.  The goal was that 
each screener conducts at least one 20 minute training session per week. 
4.2.3.1 X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT)  
The X-Ray CAT is a standardized, reliable and valid instrument to measure 
x-ray image interpretation competency as defined by the principles and 
requirements specified in Schwaninger, Bridges, Drury,  Durinckx, Durrant, 
Hodge, Hofer, Jongejan, Maguire, McClumpha, Neiderman, Steinmann & 
Wüest (2005).  It contains 256 x-ray images of passenger baggage (see 
Figure 15). 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Example of an x-ray image of a passenger bag. The image on the right 
contains the prohibited item depicted separately on the bottom right. 
Half of the bags contain a threat item, the other 128 bags are harmless.  
The threat items belong to the four categories guns, knives, IEDs and other 
prohibited items as defined in ECAC DOC 30.  Each category is 
represented by 16 threat objects (8 visually similar pairs) and each object is 
depicted in the baggage in an easy and a difficult view.  Of the visually 
similar pairs, only one item is used in training with X-Ray Tutor, while the 
other item is not used during training.  A recent study showed that the 
performance improvements as a result of training with X-Ray Tutor 
generalize to visually similar objects not shown during training (Koller, 
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Hardmeier, Michel, & Schwaninger, 2007).  While the easy view 
corresponds to the most usual (canonical) view, in the difficult view the 
threat object is rotated 85° either around the horizontal or the vertical axis.  
At test, airport security screeners have to decide for each bag whether it is 
OK (bag without threat item) or NOT OK (bag containing a threat item).  
Each image is depicted for a maximum of 15 seconds.  Depending on how 
many images an airport security screener can visually inspect during 20 
minutes, the test lasts about 2-3 sessions of 20 minutes.  For more detailed 
information about the X-Ray CAT (see Koller & Schwaninger, 2006; Koller, 
Hardmeier, Michel & Schwaninger, 2007). 
4.2.3.2  X-Ray Tutor  
X-Ray Tutor is a scientifically based training program.  It is based on 
findings about how the human brain processes visual information in order to 
recognise objects in different views, when superimposed by other objects, 
and depending on bag complexity (Schwaninger, 2003).  The training is 
individually adaptive, that is, it automatically adapts to the performance of 
individual airport security screeners.  X-Ray Tutor automatically combines 
images of fictional threat items with x-ray images of passenger bags.  This 
is performed by an individually adaptive algorithm, which takes into account 
the rotation of threat objects, the superposition by other objects in the bag, 
and bag complexity resulting from clutter and transparency of the objects in 
the baggage.  X-Ray Tutor 2.0 contains a large image library of threat 
objects that are depicted in different standardized views.  Most of the 
objects can be depicted from up to 72 different viewpoints, which allows 
training screeners to detect threat objects independent of rotation.  This 
image library was built in close collaboration with experts of Zurich State 
Police, Airport Division, and it is being extended continuously. 
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During training with X-Ray Tutor, x-ray images of bags are depicted on the 
screen for 15 seconds (standard setting).  Screeners have to decide 
whether the bag is OK (i.e. it contains no threat object) or whether it is NOT 
OK (i.e. it contains a threat object).  After each response, a feedback is 
provided informing the screener whether his/her response was correct.  If 
the bag contained a threat object the user can view detailed information and 
a real image of the threat object.  For further information on X-Ray Tutor 
see Schwaninger, 2004. 
4.2.4 Results and Discussion 
In this study, the performance of screeners to detect threat objects in the X-
Ray CAT as well as the time needed for detecting the threat objects (i.e. 
reaction time) has been analyzed.  An effect of training could imply an 
increase in detection performance and/or a decrease in reaction time. 
Furthermore, the effect of object viewpoint has been analyzed, i.e. a 
possible difference in detection performance of threat objects depending on 
the rotation with which they are depicted in the image. 
4.2.4.1  Detection Performance  
Detection performance in the X-Ray CAT was analysed using d’, a widely 
used measure of sensitivity based on signal detection theory (Green & 
Swets, 1966; Hofer & Schwaninger, 2004; MacMillan & Creelman, 1991).  
The d’ measure takes into account the hit rate as well as the false alarm 
rate.  It can be calculated by the following formula:  d’ = z(H) – z(FA), 
whereas H is the hit rate, FA the false alarm rate and z refers to the z-
transform. 
The hit rate indicates how often a person correctly judges a bag as being 
NOT OK proportionately to all bags containing a threat object.  The false 
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alarm rate indicates how often a person wrongly judges a bag as being 
NOT OK proportionately to all bags containing no threat object.  In this 
study, actual performance values are not reported due to security reasons.  
However, effect sizes are reported for all relevant analyses and interpreted 
based on Cohen (1988). 
4.2.4.1.1 Effect of Training 
Figure 16 shows the detection 
performance and the standard 
deviation2 for the easy view of the 
threat objects in each category for 
all three test measurements.  
Guns were detected best in all 
three tests and objects of the 
categories IEDs and “Other” were 
detected worst.  Substantial 
increases of detection performance 
were found, which depended on the 
threat category.  The largest training 
effects were found for IEDs.  Good 
performance was achieved for IEDs 
after the two training blocks of 4 
months each.  The aim was that all 
screeners conduct at least one 20 
minute training session per week, which was achieved on average.  Note 
                                                     
2 The standard deviation represents the range of dispersion around the mean of the data and indicates the range of 
individual differences between the tested airport security screeners. 
Figure 16: Detection performance d’ and standard 
deviations for difficult views broken up by threat 
category and test date.  Note: For security reasons 
Figure 17: Detection performance d’ and standard 
deviations for easy views broken up by threat 
category and test date.  Note: For security reasons 
d’ scores are not indicated in the figure. 
62 
 
that there are large differences between screeners as can be seen by the 
large standard deviations (thin lines in Figure 16).  Some screeners 
achieved very good performance for all types of threat objects after the two 
training phases.  This is mainly due to differences in the amount of training.  
While some screeners did only a few trainings over several months, other 
screeners did several training sessions per week and achieved very high 
performance increases. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures using d’ scores 
for easy view with the within-participant factors test date (first, second, third) 
and category (guns, knives, IEDs, other) revealed large main effects of test 
date η2 = .36, F(2, 192) = 53.82, p < .001, and category η2 = .57, F(3, 288) 
= 128.54, p < .001, and a large two-way interaction of test date and 
category η2 = .15, F(6, 576) = 16.80, p < .001.  These results confirm that 
CBT with X-Ray Tutor result in large performance increases of x-ray 
screeners, especially regarding the detection of IEDs and other threat 
items. 
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4.2.4.1.2 Effect of Object Viewpoint  
Figure 18 shows the results for detection performance d’ and standard 
deviations when threat objects were depicted from a difficult viewpoint.  
Figure 18 depicts the comparison between the detection performance for 
objects in easy view and difficult view.  It shows that detection of threat 
objects is much easier in frontal (or canonical view) than when depicted 
from a difficult viewpoint.  Large training effects have been found for difficult 
views (cf. knives) as well as for objects that are rarely seen in every day life 
(IEDs and other threat items).  The reason for this large performance 
increase is the fact that X-Ray Tutor contains a large threat image library in 
which objects are depicted in many different viewpoints (Schwaninger, 
2004).  X-Ray Tutor trains each screener individually to become able to 
detect all types of threat objects even if they are shown from a difficult 
viewpoint.  This is the reason why such large training effects were found for 
objects shown in difficult view. 
Figure 18: Detection performance d’ and standard deviations broken up by threat category, view (easy 
vs. difficult), and test date.  Note:  For security reasons d’ scores are not indicated in the figure. 
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An analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures using d’ scores for 
difficult view with the within-participant factors test date (first, second, third) 
and category (guns, knives, IEDs, other) revealed a large main effect of test 
date η2 = .46, F(2, 192) = 82.22, p < .001, a large main effect of category η2 
= 68, F(3, 288) = 200.32, p < .001, and a large two-way interaction of test 
date and category η2 = .15, F(6, 576) = 16.94, p < .001.  These results 
provide further evidence for the effectiveness of recurrent CBT with X-Ray 
Tutor, which results in large performance increases for detecting threat 
items in x-ray images. 
An additional analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures using 
d’ scores for both views (easy and difficult) with the within-participant 
factors test date (first, second, third), view (easy vs. difficult), and category 
(guns, knives, IEDs, other) was conducted to examine the effect of 
viewpoint on the detection performance of screeners.  There was a large 
main effect of test date η2 = .43, F(2, 192) = 73.23, p < .001, a large main 
effect of view (easy vs. difficult) η2 = .89, F(1, 96) = 804.15, p < .001, and a 
large main effect of category η2 = .66, F(3, 288) = 182.39, p < .001.  The 
following interactions were significant as well with large effects for the two-
way interactions between test date and category η2 = .19, F(6, 576) = 
22.34, p < .001, and between viewpoint and category η2 = .56, F(3, 288) = 
120.00, p < .001.  There was also a medium effect for the three-way 
interaction of test date, view and category, η2 = .08, F(6, 576) = 7.87, p < 
.001. 
These results show that recurrent CBT with X-Ray Tutor is very effective to 
train screeners to detect threat objects even if they are depicted from an 
unusual viewpoint. 
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4.2.4.1.3 Reaction Times 
For each response, reaction time (RT) was measured, i.e. the time between 
x-ray image onset and the time a 
response was provided by the 
screener (OK or NOT OK button).  
Figure 19 shows the RTs of all hits 
(correctly judged images as NOT 
OK) of all three test dates broken up 
by threat category.  RTs decreased 
as a result of training, especially 
from the first to the second test.  
However, there were also large 
differences between individual airport security screeners (cf. large standard 
deviations), possibly due to differences in amount of training.   
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures using RTs with the 
within-participant factors test date (first, second, third) and category (guns, 
knives, IEDs, other) revealed a large main effect of test date η2 = .47, F(2, 
192) = 85.01, p < .001, a large main effect of category η2 = .44, F(3, 288) = 
76.42, p < .001, and a large two-way interaction of test date and category η2 
= .16, F(6, 576) = 18.79, p < .001. 
4.2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This study has shown substantial increases of airport security screeners’ x-
ray image interpretation competency as a result of recurrent adaptive CBT 
using X-Ray Tutor.  The largest increase was found for the detection of 
IEDs.  After two training phases of 4 months each, detection was almost as 
good as detection of guns.  There were also large effects of viewpoint.  
Objects shown from a difficult rotation are more difficult to recognize 
Figure 19: Reaction times and standard deviations 
of hits (correctly answered as NOT OK) broken up 
by threat category and test date. 
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(especially knives) than when depicted from a non-rotated canonical view.  
However, the effect of viewpoint can be compensated by training.  At the 
third test, the difficult views were recognized much better than before 
training started (first test).  There were also large differences between 
screeners.  While some screeners did only a few trainings per month, 
others did several training sessions per week and achieved very large 
performance increases.  A large effect of training was also found in the 
reaction times.  Screeners could reduce the time needed to detect a threat 
object significantly.  More detailed analyses showed that the increase in the 
detection performance was mainly due to an increase in the hit rate (as 
opposed to a decrease in the false alarm rate), which means, that a speed-
accuracy trade off can be ruled out here. 
It is not surprising that before training, d’ scores for IEDs and also for other 
threat categories were substantially smaller than for guns.  The IEDs used 
in this study are quite sophisticated threat objects using components that 
are often not known to screeners without enhanced training in IED 
detection.  For other threat items probably this knowledge based factor 
comes into play as well.  Screeners first have to learn which objects are 
prohibited and what they look like in x-ray images.  If an effective CBT is 
used for recurrent training, a large increase in detection performance can 
be achieved (see also Schwaninger, 2004).  This shows that the detection 
of IEDs and other threat items is not difficult per se, but rather depending on 
the training of screeners. 
A recent study by Koller et al. (2007) showed that training not only has an 
effect on the detection of trained object views – which then are available in 
visual memory – but also generalizes to similar looking but untrained views 
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of other objects.  This transfer effect was revealed for all threat categories, 
i.e. for guns, IEDs and other threat items.  For knives no transfer effect was 
found.  This could be due to the shape of the knives.  On one hand, knives 
show less diagnostic features which play an important role in object 
recognition compared to objects from other categories.  These few 
diagnostic features might also get lost when a knife is rotated.  On the other 
hand, the visual similarity of knives to harmless everyday objects (e.g., pen) 
is substantial.  These factors could impede detectability and trainability of 
knives and ultimately might have resulted in rather small training and 
transfer effects for knives.  They might also be an explanation for the fact 
that for knives there is the largest viewpoint effect compared to objects from 
other categories (see Figure 18).  While objects of other threat categories in 
a rotated view usually still show many diagnostic features and also, due to 
their larger surface, more information in general, for knives much 
information might be lost with a high rotation angle.  Therefore, the 
detection and the discrimination of knives and harmless objects is hindered.  
However, rather than being a category generalisation of the gained 
knowledge, the transfer effect could also have resulted because of a large 
similarity of the object pairs.  This would imply a specific-token familiarity to 
be the reason for the transfer as Smith, Redford, Gent & Washburn (2005) 
suggest. If a specific-token familiarity would apply to the recognition of 
objects then learned knowledge about an object could not be transferred to 
an object of the same category but only to objects with the same specific 
tokens.  For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Koller et al. (2007) 
and Smith et al. (2005). 
Overall, these results are fully consistent with earlier results (Schwaninger, 
2004; Hardmeier et al., 2006; Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004; Schwaninger, 
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2003) and show that adaptive CBT such as X-Ray Tutor can be a powerful 
tool to increase efficiency in x-ray image interpretation by airport security 
screeners. 
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4.3 Investigating training, transfer, and viewpoint effects 
resulting from recurrent CBT of x-ray image interpretation 
4.3.1 Abstract 
X-ray screening of passenger bags is an essential task at airport security 
checkpoints. In this study we investigated how well airport security 
screeners can detect guns, knives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
and other threat objects in x-ray images of passenger bags before and after 
three and six months of recurrent (about 20 min per week) computer-based 
training (CBT). Two experiments conducted at different airports gave very 
similar results. Training with X-Ray Tutor (XRT), an individually adaptive 
CBT, resulted in large performance increases, especially for detecting IEDs. 
While performance for detecting IEDs was initially substantially lower than 
for guns, IEDs could be detected as well as guns after several months of 
training. A large transfer effect was observed as well: Training with XRT 
helped screeners recognize new threat objects that were similar in shape 
as the trained objects. Threat recognition was dependent on the rotation of 
the objects. If depicted from an unusual viewpoint, prohibited items were 
more difficult to recognize. The results were compared to two conventional 
(not adaptive) CBT systems. For one system no training and transfer effects 
were observed whereas small training and transfer effects were found for 
the other conventional CBT system. 
4.3.2 Introduction 
The importance of aviation security has increased dramatically in the last 
years. As a consequence of the new threat situation, large investments 
were made into modern security technology. State of the art x-ray screening 
equipment offers good image quality, high resolution and many image 
enhancement functions. However, the decision whether an x-ray image of a 
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passenger bag contains a prohibited item or not, is still being taken by a 
human operator, i.e. an airport security screener. Object shapes that are 
not similar to ones stored in visual memory are difficult to recognize (e.g., 
Graf, Schwaninger, Wallraven, and Bülthoff, 2002; Schwaninger, 2004, 
2005). Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) have shown that x-ray 
screener performance depends on knowledge-based and image-based 
factors. A prerequisite for good x-ray detection performance is knowledge 
about which objects are prohibited and what they look like in x-ray images. 
Such knowledge is acquired by computer-based, class-room and on the job 
training (knowledge-based factors). Image-based factors refer to image 
difficulty resulting from viewpoint variation of threat objects, superposition of 
threat objects by other objects in a bag, and bag complexity depending on 
the number and type of other objects in the bag. The ability to cope with 
image-based factors is related to individual visual-cognitive abilities rather 
than a mere result of training (Hardmeier, Hofer, and Schwaninger, 2006). 
Computer-based training is expected to be a very important determinant of 
x-ray image interpretation competency, because many threat objects are 
not known from everyday experience and because objects look quite 
different in x-ray images than in reality. This is illustrated in Figure 20 with 
two examples. 
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Schwaninger and Hofer (2004) and Schwaninger, Wetter and Hofer (2007) 
could show that detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in hold 
baggage screening (HBS) can be significantly improved if people are 
trained with an individually adaptive training system such as X-Ray Tutor 
(XRT). Schwaninger et al. (2005) compared detection performance of 
novices with the one of aviation security screeners. A rather poor 
recognition of unfamiliar object shapes (e.g., self-defense gas spray, 
electric shock device etc.) in x-ray images was found for novices. For 
experienced aviation security personnel, a much higher recognition 
performance was observed. McCarley, Kramer, Wickens, Vidoni and Boot 
(2004) reported a better performance after training for the detection of 
knives in x-ray images for novices.  
When one takes into account the myriad of views that can be produced by a 
single object, the question arises how the human brain stores and 
recognizes objects even if they are presented in unusual views. In the 
object recognition literature, two types of theories can be distinguished: 
structural description theories and view-based theories. The former assume 
that objects are stored in visual memory by their component parts and their 
a b
Figure 20: Different types of prohibited items in x-ray images of passenger bags. a) Electric shock 
device, b) self defense gas spray “Guardian Angel”. 
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spatial relationship. An object-centered description of this nature was 
described by Marr and Nishihara (1978), who proposed that objects are 
hierarchically decomposed into their parts and spatial relations relative to 
object-centered coordinates in order to access an object-centered 3D 
model in visual memory. In Biederman´s (1987) recognition by components 
(RBC) theory, non-accidental properties like vertices, parallel vs. non-
parallel lines, straight vs. curved lines etc. (see Lowe, 1985, 1987) are 
extracted from a line drawing representation of objects to define basic 
geometrical primitives (geometrical ions, “geons”) that are relatively 
orientation-invariant. A geon structural description (GSD) in memory is 
activated by extracting geons from the visual input and match geon 
properties and their spatial relationship with the GSD (Hummel and 
Biederman, 1992). 
For view-based theories, different approaches have been proposed. 
Examples are recognition by alignment to a 3D representation (Lowe, 
1987), recognition by linear combination of 2D views (Ullman and Basri, 
1991), recognition by view interpolation (e.g., using RBF networks) 
proposed by Poggio and Edelman (1990) and storing of multiple views for 
each object plus performing transformations (Tarr and Pinker, 1989). What 
view-based theories have in common is the assumption that objects are not 
stored in memory as rotation invariant structural descriptions but instead in 
a format which is viewer-centered. A more detailed discussion of structural 
description theories vs. view-based theories and more recent hybrid 
theories is beyond the scope of this paper (for reviews see for example 
Graf, Schwaninger, Wallraven and Bülthoff, 2002; Hayward, 2003; Kosslyn, 
1994; Peissig and Tarr, 2007; Schwaninger, 2005; Tarr and Bülthoff, 1998). 
However, it should be pointed out that empirical results seem to be 
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correlated with the required level of recognition (Bülthoff, Edelman and Tarr, 
1995; Tarr, 1995): if the object has to be recognized at 'entry level', 
behavioral measures are less affected by changes in perspective. However, 
in the case of subordinate recognition in which fine discriminations are 
typically required, both response times and accuracy are more sensitive to 
the specific viewpoint used. Furthermore, differences in the task a subject 
has to perform (Lawson, 1999) and the specific paradigm that is used 
(Verfaillie, 1992) can influence which level of representation is tapped (see 
also Logothetis and Sheinberg, 1996). 
The first aim of this study is to investigate how well airport security 
screeners can detect guns, knives, IEDs and other prohibited items in x-ray 
images of passenger bags. The second aim is to examine whether screener 
detection performance can be increased by conducting recurrent CBT. To 
this end, screeners conducted weekly recurrent CBT (about 20 min per 
week). Detection performance was tested with the X-Ray Competency 
Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) by Koller and Schwaninger (2006). This test 
measures how well people detect threat items in x-ray images of passenger 
bags. It was conducted at the beginning and then after three and six 
months of training. In addition to training effects, the X-Ray CAT allows 
measuring transfer effects, i.e. to what extent visual knowledge that was 
gained through CBT can be transferred to other threat items (see below). In 
the X-Ray CAT all prohibited items are depicted from a canonical (easy 
recognizable) perspective (Palmer, Rosch and Chase, 1981) and unusual 
perspective which allows investigating viewpoint effects. The study was 
conducted at two mid-size European airports. In Airport 1 (Experiment 1) 
one group of screeners used adaptive CBT (XRT) whereas the other group 
of screeners (control group) used a conventional (not adaptive) CBT. In 
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Airport 2 (Experiment 2) the same experimental design was used except for 
the fact that the control group used another conventional CBT system. This 
allows investigating whether a training effect is dependent on the type of the 
CBT system used. 
4.3.3 Experiment 1 
4.3.3.1  Method 
4.3.3.1.1 Participants 
A total of 209 airport security screeners of a mid-size European airport 
participated in Experiment 1 and conducted the X-Ray CAT 1.0.0 three 
times with an interval of three months between the measurements. The 
adaptive CBT group (XRT group) consisted of 97 screeners who conducted 
weekly recurrent CBT using X-Ray Tutor (XRT) CBS 2.0 Standard Edition 
between all three test measurements. The control group consisted of 112 
screeners who used a conventional (not adaptive) CBT. According to the 
security organization and their Appropriate Authority, airport security 
screeners of both groups conducted about 20 min CBT per week. Analysis 
of XRT training use showed that on average, each screener trained 20.26 
minutes (SD = 3.65 min) per week. 
4.3.3.2  Materials and Procedure 
4.3.3.2.1 X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) 
The X-Ray CAT consists of 256 trials based on 128 different color x-ray 
images of passenger bags. Each of the bag images is used once containing 
a prohibited item (threat image) and once without any threat object (non 
threat image). Figure 21 displays examples of the stimuli. Note that in the 
test the images are displayed in color. 
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Figure 22: Example of two x-ray images of 
similar looking threat objects used in the test. 
Left: a gun of set A. Right: Corresponding gun 
of set B. 
Prohibited objects can be assigned to four categories as defined in Doc 30 
of the European 
Civil Aviation 
Conference (ECAC): 
guns, IEDs, knives 
and other prohibited 
items (e.g., self-
defense gas spray, 
chemicals, grenades etc.). The threat objects have been selected and 
prepared in collaboration with experts of Zurich State Police, Airport 
Division to be representative and realistic. For each threat category 16 
exemplars are used (eight pairs). Each pair consists of two prohibited items 
that are similar in shape (see Figure 22). These were distributed randomly 
into two sets, set A and set B. 
Prohibited items of set A (non threat 
bag images) are contained in the 
XRT CBS 2.x SE training whereas 
the items of set B are not. This 
allows testing for transfer effects. 
Every item is depicted from two 
different viewpoints. The easy 
viewpoint refers to the canonical (i.e. easy recognizable) perspective 
(Palmer et al., 1981). The difficult viewpoint shows the threat item with an 
85 degree horizontal rotation or an 85 degree vertical rotation relative to the 
canonical view (see Figure 22 for examples). In each threat category, half 
of the prohibited items of the difficult viewpoint are rotated vertically, the 
Figure 21: Example images from the X-Ray CAT. Left: harmless bag (non threat 
image), right: same bag with a prohibited item at the top right corner (threat image). 
The prohibited item (gun) is shown also separately at the bottom right. 
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other half horizontally. Set A and B are equalized concerning the rotations 
of the prohibited objects. 
Every threat item is combined with a bag in a manner that the degree of 
superposition by other objects is similar for both viewpoints. This was 
achieved using a function that calculates the difference between the pixel 
intensity values of the bag image with the threat object minus the bag 
image without the threat object using the following formula: 
Using this equation (division by object size), the superposition value is 
independent on the size of the prohibited item. This value can be kept 
relatively constant for the two views of a threat object, independent of the 
degree of clutter in a bag, when combining the bag image and the 
prohibited item. The bag images were visually inspected by aviation 
security experts to ensure they do not contain any other prohibited items. 
Harmless bags were assigned to the different categories and viewpoints of 
the threat objects in a way that their difficulty was balanced across all 
categories3. The false alarm rate (the rate at which screeners wrongly 
judged a harmless bag as containing a threat item) for each bag image 
served as measure of difficulty based on a pilot study with 192 screeners of 
another airport. 
                                                     
3 The eight categories of test images (four threat categories in two viewpoints each) are similar in terms of the 
difficulty of the harmless bags. This means, a difference of detection performance between categories or 
viewpoints can not be due to differences in the difficulty of the bag images. 
SP = Superposition; ISN = Grayscale intensity of the SN (Signal plus Noise) image (contains a prohibited item); IN = 
Grayscale intensity of the N (Noise) image (contains no prohibited item); Object Size: Number of pixels of the 
prohibited item where R, G and B are < 253 
[ ]
ObjectSize
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The X-Ray CAT takes about 30-40 minutes to complete. Each image is 
shown for a maximum of 10 seconds on the screen. Screeners have to 
judge whether the bag is OK (contains no prohibited item) or NOT OK 
(contains a prohibited item). Additionally, screeners have to indicate the 
perceived difficulty of each image on a 100 point scale (difficulty rating)4. 
The X-Ray CAT is built into the XRT training system (see below). The 
interface of the X-Ray CAT is the same as in XRT except there is no 
feedback and screeners do not have to click on the image to identify the 
threat object. 
4.3.4 X-Ray Tutor (XRT) Training System 
X-Ray Tutor (XRT) is an individually adaptive training system for aviation 
                                                     
4 The difficulty ratings were not analyzed in this study. 
Figure 23: Screenshot of the XRT CBS 2.0 training system during training. At the bottom 
right a feedback is provided after each response. If a bag contains a prohibited item, an 
information window can be displayed (see bottom left of the screen). 
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security screeners. It contains a large image library with hundreds of 
different threat objects depicted in up to 72 views, more than 6000 bag 
images and many millions of possible threat object to bag combinations 
(see Schwaninger, 2004 for details). The individually adaptive training 
algorithm of XRT starts with showing threat objects depicted from easy 
viewpoints with little superposition by other objects and in bags of low 
complexity. Based on each individual screeners´ learning progress, threat 
objects are shown in more difficult views, more complex bags and with 
more superposition. These parameters are adapted automatically by a 
scientifically validated algorithm for each screener and threat object while 
taking into account automatic image processing algorithms as explained in 
Schwaninger, Michel and Bolfing (2007). XRT first presents screeners 
prohibited objects in easy (canonical) views. The individually adaptive 
training algorithm determines for each screener which views are difficult to 
recognize and adapts the training so that the trainee becomes able to 
detect threat items reliably even if prohibited objects are substantially 
rotated away from the easiest view. During the next difficulty levels, first 
superposition and then bag complexity is increased so that the trainee 
becomes able to detect threat items reliably even if they are superimposed 
by other objects or if the complexity of a bag is very high (for more 
information on XRT see Schwaninger, 2003, 2004, 2005b). 
During a training session each image is displayed for 15 seconds on the 
screen. Within this time screeners can use image enhancement functions 
which are also available when working with the x-ray machine (e.g., 
grayscale, negative image, edge enhancement, etc.). If the image contains 
a prohibited item, screeners have to click on it and then click on the NOT 
OK button. If the bag is harmless; they have to click on the OK button. After 
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providing a confidence rating using a slider control, feedback is shown to 
inform the trainee whether the image has been judged correctly or not (see 
Figure 23). If the bag contains a threat item, it is highlighted by flickering 
and the trainee has the possibility to display information about the threat 
item (see bottom left of Figure 23). By clicking on the continue button the 
next image is shown. As a default setting, one training sessions takes 20 
minutes. During this time screeners see between 150 and 300 images. 
4.3.5 Procedure 
As explained above, two groups of screeners participated in Experiment 1. 
The XRT training group conducted weekly recurrent CBT using XRT CBS 
2.0 Standard Edition. The control group used a conventional (not adaptive) 
CBT. In order to avoid potential negative consequences, we decided not to 
mention the exact CBT product in this article. However, it can be mentioned 
that this CBT is also widely used at many airports worldwide. It has a much 
smaller threat image library than XRT, threat objects are not displayed in 
many different views, threat objects are not matched with different bags on 
the fly, and there is no individually adaptive training algorithm. 
The XRT training group and the control group took the X-Ray CAT before, 
after three, and after six months of weekly CBT. This allows testing the 
effectiveness of both CBT systems for increasing x-ray image interpretation 
competency of airport security screeners. As explained above, half of the 
prohibited items in the X-Ray CAT are also contained in the XRT training 
system (although presented in different bags). The other half of the 
prohibited items of the X-Ray CAT is not part of the XRT training library. 
This allows testing for transfer effects, i.e. testing whether training with the 
detection of certain prohibited items helps increasing the detection of other 
prohibited items. Finally, as specified above in the section on the X-Ray 
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CAT, all prohibited items are depicted in easy and difficult view which 
allows testing effects of viewpoint on screener detection performance. 
4.3.6 Results and Discussion 
Detection performance was calculated using 
the signal detection measure d’ (Green and 
Swets, 1966), which takes into account the hit 
rate (correctly judged threat images as being 
NOT OK) and the false alarm rate (wrongly 
judged harmless bags as being NOT OK). D’ is calculated using the 
following formula:  d´= z(H) – z(FA). Whereas H is the hit rate, FA the false 
alarm rate and z refers to the z-transformation. Performance values are not 
reported due to security reasons. However, effect sizes are reported for all 
relevant analyses and interpreted based on Cohen (1988), see Table 8. For 
t-tests, d between 0.20 and 0.49 represents small effect size; d between 
0.50 and 0.79 represents medium effect size; d ≥ 0. 80 represent large 
effect size. For analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistics, η2 between 0.01 
and 0.05 represents small effect size; η2 between 0.06 and 0.13 represents 
medium effect size; η2 ≥ 0.14 represent large effect size. 
Table 8: Classification of effect sizes 
based on Cohen (1988) 
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Figure 24 shows the detection performance of the first, second and third 
measurement for both screener groups. As can be seen in the Figure, there 
was a large improvement as a result of training in the XRT training group 
while there was no improvement in the control group. These results were 
confirmed by an ANOVA for repeated measures using d’ scores with the 
within-participant factor measurement (first, second and third) and the 
between-participant factor group (XRT training group and control group). 
There were large main effects of measurement, η2 = .28, F(2, 414) = 81.04, 
p < .001, and group, η2 = .19, F(1, 207) = 47.62, p < .001. There was also a 
large interaction of measurement and group, η2 = .25, F(2, 414) = 68.67, p < 
.001, which is consistent with Figure 24 showing large performance 
increases as a result of training only for the XRT training group but not for 
the control group. 
Figure 24: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group (left) vs. the 
control group  (right) comparing first, second and third measurement 
XRT Training Group (n=97) Control Group (n=112)
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Separate pairwise t-tests of detection performance d’ revealed no 
significant difference at the baseline measurement between the two groups 
t(177) = - 0.91, p = .363, d = 0.13, but already a significant difference in the 
second measurement, i.e. after three months of training, t(207) = 7.52, p < 
.001, d = 1.04. Additional paired-samples t-tests revealed significant 
differences for the XRT training group between all three test measurements 
but no significant differences for the control group (see Table 9). 
Table 9: Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of first (t1), second (t2) and third (t3) 
measurement 
 t(96) p d 
XRT Training Group (t1 – t2) -9.80 < .001 1.12 
XRT Training Group (t2 – t3) -3.95 < .001 0.28 
 
t(111) P d 
Control Group (t1 – t2) .54 = .59 0.05 
Control Group (t2 – t3) -1.89 = .06 0.17 
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Figure 25 shows the detection performance of both screener groups broken 
up by prohibited item category and the three test measurements. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-participant factors 
measurement (first, second and third) and threat category (guns, IEDs, 
knives and other), and the between-participant factor group (XRT training 
vs. control) revealed the significant main effects and significant interactions 
given in Table 10a. In addition to the effects that were already found in the 
previous ANOVA, also the factor threat (or prohibited item) category was 
significant. As can be seen in Figure 25, guns were detected best, followed 
by knives, other prohibited items and IEDs at the first test measurement. 
There was a highly significant interaction between threat category and 
Figure 25: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group broken up by prohibited item category and test measurement. 
Guns IEDs Knives Other Guns IEDs Knives Other
XRT Training Group (n=97) Control Group (n=112)
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measurement. As can be seen in Figure 25, detection of IEDs was initially 
much lower than gun detection. After six months of training, screeners of 
the XRT training group could detect IEDs even slightly better than guns. 
This result implies that IED detection is not difficult per se but rather a 
matter of the right training. Note that in this study all IEDs contained a 
detonator, wires, explosive, a triggering device and a power source. Thus 
our conclusions are only applicable to the detection of such multi-
component IEDs. Large performance increases were also found for other 
prohibited items in this group, while for knives, only a small improvement as 
a result of training was found. Note that after six months of training, 
detection performance of knives is lower than the one for any other threat 
category in the XRT training group; although at baseline measurement it 
was higher than the detection performance for IEDs or other threat objects. 
The interaction between threat category, group and measurement is also 
worth mentioning. As can be seen in Figure 25 this results from the fact that 
there was no training effect for the control group. Their detection 
performance remains at about the same level for each threat category even 
after six months of training with the conventional (not adaptive) CBT 
system. 
Separate pairwise t-tests were conducted to compare detection 
performance at the first and the second measurement for both groups and 
each threat category separately (Table 11). The XRT training group showed 
a significant increase of the detection performance at the second 
measurement for the categories guns, IEDs and other threat objects. For 
knives, a significant difference could be found only in the third 
measurement. The comparison of the effect size d between the t-tests of 
the four threat categories confirms the earlier mentioned conclusion that the 
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training effect was particularly big for IEDs and rather small for knives. 
Detection performance of the control group did not differ significantly 
between the measurements, confirming that the conventional CBT did not 
result in an increase of threat detection performance. 
 
 Factor df F η2 p 
a) 
Measurement (M) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
T x G 
M x T 
M x T x G 
2, 414 
3, 621 
1, 207 
2, 414 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
6, 1242 
83.96 
240.03 
56.20 
70.49 
45.05 
43.20 
40.65 
.29 
.54 
.21 
.25 
.18 
.17 
.16 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
b) 
Measurement (M) 
Set (S) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x S 
S x G 
M x S x G 
2, 414 
1, 207 
1, 207 
2, 414 
2, 414 
1, 207 
2, 414 
80.55 
4.18 
49.40 
67.99 
8.80 
51.32 
11.54 
.28 
.02 
.19 
.25 
.04 
.20 
.05 
< .001 
< .05 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
c) Measurement (M) 2, 414 87.69 .30 < .001 
Table 10: Results of the ANOVAs in Experiment 1 
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Set (S) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x T 
M x S 
S x G 
S x T 
T x G 
M x T x G 
M x S x G 
M x S x T 
S x T x G 
M x S x T x G 
1, 207 
3, 621 
1, 207 
2,414 
6, 1242 
2, 414 
1, 207 
3, 621 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
2, 414 
6, 1242 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
2.37 
236.79 
63.57 
71.16 
44.35 
10.93 
52.25 
74.00 
47.39 
41.04 
10.74 
3.84 
4.78 
2.99 
.01 
.53 
.24 
.26 
.18 
.05 
.20 
.26 
.19 
.17 
.05 
.02 
.02 
.01 
= .13 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .01 
< .01 
< .01 
d) 
Measurement (M) 
View (V) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x T 
M x V 
2,414 
1, 207 
3, 621 
1, 207 
2, 414 
6, 1242 
2, 414 
84.10 
1768.63 
258.62 
61.91 
65.80 
41.33 
2.05 
.29 
.90 
.56 
.23 
.24 
.17 
.01 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
= .13 
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V x G 
V x T 
T x G 
M x T x G 
M x V x G 
M x V x T 
V x T x G 
M x V x T x G 
1, 207 
3, 621 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
2, 414 
6, 1242 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
3.27 
425.64 
40.86 
40.25 
2.23 
6.58 
3.08 
2.68 
.02 
.67 
.17 
.16 
.01 
.03 
.02 
.01 
= .07 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .05 
< .001 
< .05 
< .05 
 
XRT training 
group 
t(96) df p d 
Guns t1 – t2 - 5.96 96 < .001 0.70 
IEDs t1 – t2 - 13.03 96 < .001 1.53 
Knives t1 – t2 - 1.51 96 = .13 0.17 
Other t1 – t2 - 8.47 96 < .001 1.07 
     
Guns t1 – t3 - 4.69 96 < .001 0.60 
IEDs t1 – t3 - 15.88 96 < .001 2.00 
Knives t1 – t3 - 2.27 96 < .05 0.26 
Table 11: Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of the four categories between the 
first (t1), second (t2) and third (t3) measurement 
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Other t1 – t3 - 12.56 96 < .001 1.51 
     
Control group t(111) df p d 
Guns t1 – t2 - 0.40 111 = .69 0.05 
IEDs t1 – t2 0.03 111 = .98 0.00 
Knives t1 – t2 0.83 111 = .41 0.09 
Other t1 – t2 -0.17 111 = .87 0.02 
     
Guns t1 – t3 -0.92 111 = .36 0.10 
IEDs t1 – t3 -1.05 111 = .30 0.08 
Knives t1 – t3 -0.73 111 = .47 0.08 
Other t1 – t3 -1.39 111 = .17 0.15 
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The results of the analyses considering the two prohibited item sets of the 
X-Ray CAT, set A and set B, are shown in Figures 26 and 27. As explained 
Figure 26: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the 
control group comparing first, second and third measurement for set A and set B separately 
XRT Training Group (n=97) Control Group (n=112)
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Figure 27: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group 
vs. the control group comparing first, second and third measurement for set A and set 
B and each threat category separately 
Guns IEDs Knives Other Guns IEDs Knives Other
XRT Training Group (n=97) Control Group (n=112)
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above, set A items are X-Ray CAT images which contain prohibited items 
which are part of the XRT image library. Set B items are X-Ray CAT images 
which contain prohibited items that are not part of the XRT image library. By 
comparing training effects for set A and set B transfer effects can be 
investigated, i.e. whether training with XRT does not only improve detection 
of prohibited items that are part of the XRT image library (set A) but also the 
detection of other prohibited items that are visually similar (set B). Figure 27 
shows the detection performance for both screener groups broken up by 
test set for all three measurements. It shows a clear increase in detection 
performance for the XRT training group, especially at the second 
measurement, after the first three months of training. For the control group, 
as in the previous analysis, no training effect is evident. The results of the 
repeated measures ANOVA with the within-participant factors measurement 
(first, second and third) and set (A vs. B) and the between-participant factor 
group (XRT training group vs. control group) can be seen in Table 10b. 
There was a significant effect of set in this analysis, which would imply a 
different detection performance for set A vs. set B. However, the effect is 
very small, as the effect size of η2= 0.2 clearly shows, which makes the 
difference quasi negligible. This is also supported by the small effect size 
for the interaction between set and measurement, η2= 0.4. Pairwise t-tests 
showed a significant increase in detection performance at the second 
measurement for both sets for the XRT training group, set A, t(96) = - 
10.27, p < .001, d = 1.19, set B, t(96) = - 7.68, p < .001, d = 0.92. These 
results indicate a large transfer effect, i.e. visual knowledge regarding the 
visual appearance of the prohibited objects of the XRT image library helped 
screeners to detect similar looking, but untrained objects in the X-Ray CAT 
(set B). Consistent with previous analyses, there was no training effect for 
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the control group, neither for set A, t(111) = .76, p = .45, d = 0.08, nor for 
set B, t(111) = - 0.28, p = .78, d = 0.03. Pairwise t-tests comparing both 
sets within one group at the first measurement revealed a significant 
difference of the two sets only for the control group t(111) = - 2.82, p < .01, 
d = 0.17 but not for the XRT training group, t(96) = - 0.42, p = .68, d = 0.03. 
However, note that an effect size of d = 0.17 is very small which supports 
the assumption that the two sets are in fact very similar in their difficulty 
level. Figure 27 includes also the threat category in the analysis. The 
increase in detection performance for the XRT training group can also be 
seen in the different threat categories. Pairwise t-tests between the first and 
second measurement confirmed a significant (p < .001, all d > 0.62) 
increase in detection performance for the XRT training group for all threat 
categories per set except for knives (set A: p = .12, d = 0.19, set B; p = .32, 
d = 0.12). In Figure 27, detection performance in Set A for guns shows a 
decrease between the second and third measurement. However, this 
difference was not significant (p = .13, d = 0.17). For the control group, 
detection performance between the first and third measurement was 
compared in order to maximize the chances for finding a significant training 
effect. Even here, for all categories in each set, the detection between the 
first and third measurement did not differ significantly (all p > .12, d < 
0.18).The extended ANOVA with the additional within-participant factor 
threat category revealed the main effects and interactions as specified in 
Table 10c. The main effect of set was not significant but there were 
significant interactions with set (see Table 10c). However, as can be seen 
in Figure 27, these interactions are rather small, which implies large transfer 
effects. 
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Figure 28 shows the results of the viewpoint analysis. An ANOVA was 
conducted on d’ scores with the within-participant factors measurement, 
threat category and viewpoint and the between-participants factor group. It 
showed significant main effects of measurement, category, viewpoint and 
group. For details and interactions see Table 10d. The large main effect of 
viewpoint indicates a higher detection performance for objects in easy 
(canonical) viewpoint compared to objects presented in a difficult (rotated) 
view (cf. Figure 28).  
However, no significant interaction between viewpoint and training could be 
found. This would suggest that the viewpoint effect is unaffected by the 
training and could not be decreased. Pairwise t-tests showed a significant 
increase in detection performance at the second measurement for both 
Figure 28: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control group 
comparing first, second and third measurement for both views and each threat category separately 
Guns IEDs Knives Other Guns IEDs Knives Other
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views in all categories for the XRT training group with the exception of 
knives in the easy view (p = .53, d = 0.07).  
All other comparisons were significant p < .05, d > 0.31). For the control 
group no significant increase in detection performance could be found (all p 
> .10, d < .0.19), see Table 12 for details. Training with XRT has an effect 
not only on the objects in the easy view but also on those in the difficult 
view. The screeners could make the association between the rotated object 
they detected during training and the canonical view of the object which is 
displayed in the object information in XRT. 
 
 
XRT training group t(96) p d 
Guns: V1t1 – V1t2 -4.21 < .01 0.53 
IEDs: V1t1 – V1t2 -12.25 < .001 1.42 
Knives: V1t1 – V1t2 0.64 = .53 0.07 
Other: V1t1 – V1t2 -8.95 < .001 1.12 
Guns: V2t1 – V2t2 -6.03 < .001 0.70 
IEDs: V2t1 – V2t2 -11.45 < .001 1.43 
Knives: V2t1 – V2t2 -2.53 < .05 0.31 
Other: V2t1 – V2t2 -6.17 < .001 0.84 
    
Control group t(111) p d 
Table 12: Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of the four categories for 
easy view (V1) and difficult view (V2) between the first (t1) and second (t2) measurement 
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Guns: V1t1 – V1t2 -0.21 = .84 0.02 
IEDs: V1t1 – V1t2 -0.76 = .45 0.08 
Knives: V1t1 – V1t2 -0.66 = .51 0.07 
Other: V1t1 – V1t2 -1.26 = .21 0.13 
Guns: V2t1 – V2t2 -0.67 = .50 0.09 
IEDs: V2t1 – V2t2 0.71 = .48 0.07 
Knives: V2t1 – V2t2 1.65 = .10 0.19 
Other: V2t1 – V2t2 0.64 = .53 0.07 
In summary, a large and significant training effect was found for the group 
who trained with XRT for three and six months compared to a control group 
who used another CBT for the same time. A significant training effect has 
been observed for all four threat categories (guns, knives, IEDs and other), 
whereas the extent of the effect varied between categories. A large transfer 
of the acquired knowledge about the visual appearance of trained objects 
(set A) to untrained but similar looking objects (set B) was found for the 
XRT training group but not for the control group. This means that training 
with XRT helped screeners to detect other prohibited items which were not 
part of the XRT training. Substantial effects of viewpoint could be observed, 
i.e. unusual views of prohibited objects were much harder to detect than 
canonical views. 
4.3.7 Experiment 2 
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the results of Experiment 1 
at another European airport. In addition, another conventional CBT was 
used for the control group. Thus it could be investigated whether 
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conventional CBTs differ from each other regarding training effectiveness 
compared to XRT. 
4.3.7.1 Method 
4.3.7.1.1 Participants 
A total of 163 airport security screeners of another mid-size European 
airport participated in Experiment 2. All screeners conducted the X-Ray 
CAT 1.0.0 three times with an interval of three months between the 
measurements. The adaptive CBT group (XRT group) consisted of 84 
screeners who conducted weekly recurrent CBT using X-Ray Tutor (XRT) 
CBS 2.0 Standard Edition between all three test measurements. The 
control group consisted of 79 screeners and they used another 
conventional CBT than the control group of Experiment 1. As in Experiment 
1, according to the security organization and their Appropriate Authority, 
airport security screeners of both groups conducted about 20 min CBT per 
week. Analysis of XRT training use showed that on average, each screener 
trained 20.92 minutes (SD = 2.87) per week. 
4.3.7.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
Materials and procedure in Experiment 2 were the same as in Experiment 
1. Again, all screeners took the X-Ray CAT at the beginning and after three 
and six months of CBT. The only difference was the CBT for the control 
group, which was another one than in Experiment 1. In order to avoid 
potential negative consequences, we decided not to mention the exact CBT 
product in this article for Experiment 2, neither. However, it can be 
mentioned that also this CBT is widely used at many airports worldwide. As 
the conventional CBT used in Experiment 1, this CBT has a much smaller 
threat image library than XRT, threat objects are not displayed in many 
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different views, threat objects are not matched with different bags 
automatically on the fly, and there is no individually adaptive training 
algorithm. 
4.3.8 Results and Discussion 
This section is structured the same way as in Experiment 1. Figure 29 
shows the detection performance d’ for both groups and all three test 
measurements. As in Experiment 1, individual d´ scores were subjected to 
a repeated measures ANOVA with the within-participant factor 
measurement (first, second and third) and the between-participant factor 
group (XRT training group and control group). Again, there were large main 
effects of measurement η2 = .50, F(2, 322) = 163.52, p < .001, group, η2 = 
.26, F(1, 161) = 56.34, p < .001, and a significant interaction of 
measurement and group η2 = .33, F(2, 322) = 78.40, p < .001. The large 
interaction is consistent with Figure 29 showing a much larger performance 
increase as a result of training for the XRT training group when compared 
Figure 29: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control group 
comparing first, second and third measurement. 
XRT Training Group (n=84) Control Group (n=79)
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to the control group. This was confirmed by independent samples t-tests. 
There was no significant difference between both groups for the first 
measurement t(161) = -.22, p = .83, d = 0.03, but a highly significant 
difference already in the second measurement t(161) = 6.66, p < .001, d = 
1.05 after three months of training. As in Experiment 1, additional paired-
samples t-tests revealed significant differences for the XRT training group 
between all measurements. In contrast to Experiment 1, there were also 
significant differences for the control group between the first and second 
measurement, although not between the second and third measurement 
(see Table 13). Thus, the conventional CBT used in Experiment 2 did also 
result in increased detection performance although substantially less than 
XRT. 
 
 t(83) p d 
XRT Training Group (t1 – t2) -12.21 < .001 1.57 
XRT Training Group (t2 – t3) -7.07 < .001 0.65 
 t(78) p d 
Control Group (t1 – t2) -3.67 < .001 0.36 
Control Group (t2 – t3) -0.91 = .37 0.07 
Table 13: Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of first (t1), second (t2) and third (t3) 
measurement 
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Figure 30 shows the detection performance of both screener groups broken 
up by prohibited item category and the three test measurements. Again, a 
clear effect of training on the detection performance can be seen for the 
XRT training group with the largest increase after the first three months of 
training. However, also the control group shows a slight increase in 
detection performance at least for the second measurement. The analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with threat category as additional within-participant 
factor showed significant main effects and significant interactions (for 
details see Table 14a). The results are comparable to those in Experiment 
1. Most importantly, detection of guns was best initially, while detection of 
IEDs was much lower. After six months of recurrent adaptive CBT, 
screeners of the XRT training group could detect IEDs even slightly better 
Figure 30: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the 
control group comparing first, second and third measurement for each threat category separately 
Guns IEDs Knives Other Guns IEDs Knives Other
XRT Training Group (n=84) Control Group (n=79)
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than guns. This nice replication of the results obtained in Experiment 1 
clearly shows that IED detection is not difficult per se but only a matter of 
the right training. As mentioned above, all IEDs used in this study contained 
a detonator, wires, explosive, a triggering device and a power source. Thus 
our conclusions are only applicable to the detection of such multi-
component IEDs. As shown in Table 15, t-tests between the first and 
second measurement revealed significant training effects for the XRT 
training group for all threat categories with large effect sizes (all d > .0.80). 
In contrast to Experiment 1, there were also significant effects for the 
control group, although with rather low effect sizes (all d < 0.56). Thus the 
conventional CBT used in Experiment 2 also resulted in performance 
increases although much less than XRT. 
 
 
 Factor df F η2 p 
a) 
Measurement (M) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
T x G 
M x T 
M x T x G 
2, 322 
3, 483 
1, 161 
2, 322 
3, 483 
6, 966 
6, 966 
160.78 
234.85 
64.98 
78.54 
37.63 
26.24 
16.67 
.50 
.59 
.29 
.33 
.19 
.14 
.09 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
b) Measurement (M) 2, 322 156.12 .49 < .001 
Table 14: Results of the ANOVAs in Experiment 2 
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Set (S) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x S 
S x G 
M x S x G 
1, 161 
1, 161 
2,322 
2, 322 
1, 161 
2, 322 
58.45 
56.03 
82.16 
8.88 
31.37 
15.52 
.27 
.26 
.34 
.05 
.16 
.09 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
c) 
Measurement (M) 
Set (S) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x T 
M x S 
S x G 
S x T 
T x G 
M x T x G 
M x S x G 
M x S x T 
S x T x G 
M x S x T x G 
2, 322 
1, 161 
3, 483 
1, 161 
2, 322 
6, 966 
2, 322 
1, 161 
3, 483 
3, 483 
6, 966 
2, 322 
6, 966 
3, 483 
6, 966 
162.28 
41.88 
231.83 
71.93 
84.18 
27.50 
11.42 
36.23 
33.59 
40.15 
16.87 
10.09 
1.48 
3.69 
2.64 
.50 
.21 
.59 
.31 
.34 
.15 
.07 
.18 
.17 
.20 
.10 
.06 
.01 
.02 
.02 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
= .18 
< .05 
< .05 
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d) 
Measurement (M) 
View (V) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x T 
M x V 
V x G 
V x T 
T x G 
M x T x G 
M x V x G 
M x V x T 
V x T x G 
M x V x T x G 
2, 322 
1, 161 
3, 483 
1, 161 
2, 322 
6, 966 
2, 322 
1, 161 
3, 483 
3, 483 
6, 966 
2, 322 
6, 966 
3, 483 
6, 966 
152.62 
1849.85 
216.74 
70.32 
80.05 
26.57 
2.99 
0.62 
288.98 
34.91 
14.95 
1.21 
2.82 
1.69 
1.89 
.49 
.92 
.57 
.30 
.33 
.14 
.02 
.00 
.64 
.18 
.09 
.01 
.02 
.01 
.01 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
= .05 
= .43 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
= .30 
< .05 
= .17 
= .08 
 
XRT training group t df p d 
Guns t1 – t2 -6.01 83 < .001 0.86 
IEDs t1 – t2 -12.84 83 < .001 1.74 
Knives t1 – t2 -5.81 83 < .001 0.80 
Table 15: Results of the t-tests comparing the categories between first (t1), second (t2) and third (t3) 
measurement 
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Other t1 – t2 -12.30 83 < .001 1.64 
     
Guns t1 – t3 -8.19 83 < .001 1.15 
IEDs t1 – t3 -20.22 83 < .001 2.70 
Knives t1 – t3 -10.97 83 < .001 1.48 
Other t1 – t3 -16.46 83 < .001 2.18 
     
Control group t df p d 
Guns t1 – t2 -2.19 78 < .05 0.23 
IEDs t1 – t2 -3.60 78 < .01 0.42 
Knives t1 – t2 -2.73 78 < .01 0.33 
Other t1 – t2 -1.46 78 < .15 0.18 
     
Guns t1 – t3 -2.72 78 < .01 0.34 
IEDs t1 – t3 -4.61 78 < .001 0.56 
Knives t1 – t3 -2.05 78 < .05 0.23 
Other t1 – t3 -2.59 78 < .05 0.30 
 
By an ANOVA with measurement and set as within-participant factors and 
group as between-participants factor, we investigated if training effects can 
also be shown for threat objects which were not included in the training 
sessions. There were main effects and interactions for all factors showing 
similar results as in Experiment 1 (see Table 14b for details). As in 
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Experiment 1, a large transfer effect was found (see Figure 31). Not only for 
the prohibited items of set A, which were included in the training library of 
XRT, but also for the untrained prohibited objects of set B, screeners of the 
XRT training group showed a large increase in detection performance after 
training. Paired-samples t-tests between the first and second measurement 
showed training effects for both sets and also for both groups whereas 
again large effect sizes were found for the XRT training group and small 
effect sizes for the control group (trained group set A: t(83) = - 13.10, p < 
.001, d = 1.77 and set B: t(83) = - 9.53, p < .001, d = 1.24, control group set 
A: t(78) = -2.32, p < .05, d = 0.24 and set B: t(78) = - 3.00, p < .01, d = 
0.32). Pairwise t-tests showed no significant difference in the difficulty of set 
A and Set B for both groups at the first measurement (XRT training group: 
t(83) = 1.16, p = .25, d = 0.10, control group: t(78) = 1.93, p = .06, d = 0.19). 
Figure 31: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the 
control group comparing first, second and third measurement for set A and set B separately 
XRT Training Group (n=84) Control Group (n=79)
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Figure 32 includes also the threat category in the analysis. Paired samples 
t-tests were calculated in order to investigate if the training effect between 
the first and second measurement was significant for each category in both 
sets for the XRT training group. Results revealed significant effects for all 
categories in each set (p < .01, d = 0.51 for knives in Set B, p < .001, d > 
0.74 for all other categories). Thus, as in Experiment 1, XRT resulted in 
large detection performance increases even for prohibited objects that are 
not part of the XRT image library (X-Ray CAT image set B). For the control 
group the difference between the first and third measurement was 
calculated in order to maximize the chances for finding a significant training 
effect. The following t-tests were significant: IEDs for both sets, knives only 
for set A, and other threat objects for both sets (p <.05, d > 0.23). All other 
values were not significant (p > .06, d < 0.28) and reveal no effect of 
training between the different measurements. 
Figure 32: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the 
control group comparing first, second and third measurement for set A and set B and each 
Guns IEDs Knives Other Guns IEDs Knives Other
XRT Training Group (n=84) Control Group (n=79)
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As in Experiment 1, individual d´ scores were subjected to an extended 
ANOVA with the within-participant factors measurement, X-Ray CAT image 
set, threat category and the between-participants factor group. All main 
effects and interactions were significant except the interaction between 
measurement, set and threat category (see Table 14c for details). In 
contrast to Experiment 1 the ANOVA revealed a main effect of set and 
significant interactions with set. However, as can be seen in Figure 31 they 
were rather small, which implies large transfer effects. As in Experiment 1 
the results clearly show a training effect for each category and in both sets. 
This is consistent with the results of the t-tests explained above. The 
training effect that was found for the control group revealed itself also in the 
sets, that is, there was a transfer effect for the control group, too. 
Figure 33: Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control group 
comparing first, second and third measurement for both views and each threat category separately 
Guns IEDs Knives Other Guns IEDs Knives Other
XRT Training Group (n=84) Control Group (n=79)
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Last, the effect of viewpoint was investigated calculating a four-way 
ANOVA. Results show clear main effects of measurement, view, threat 
category and group. For details on interactions please refer to Table 14d. 
Detection performance is clearly much higher for objects that are shown in 
the easy view (View 1) than for the objects that are shown from an unusual 
viewpoint (see Figure 33). This effect is valid for all threat categories and for 
the XRT training group as well as for the control group. However, the 
viewpoint effect is not the same for different threat categories. The graphs 
in Figure 33 suggest that the largest viewpoint effect can be observed for 
the detection of knives, the smallest one for IEDs. 
As in Experiment 1, pairwise t-tests showed a significant increase in 
detection performance at the second measurement for both views for the 
XRT training group for all four threat categories (p < .01, d > 0.49. For the 
easy view, the control group showed a significant effect for IEDs only (p < 
.05, d = 0.32), all other t-tests were not significant (p > .07, d < 0.25). For 
the difficult view all t-test with one exception were significant for the control 
group (p < .05, d > 0.26). Only the training effect of knives in the rotated 
view was not significant p = .07, d = 0.24 (see Table 16 for details). But the 
results show that although some significant effects in the control group were 
observed, effect sizes were small compared to those of the XRT training 
group. 
 
XRT training group t(83) p d 
Guns: V1t1 – V1t2 -3.59 < .01 0.49 
Table 16: Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of the four categories for 
easy view (V1) and difficult view (V2) between the first (t1) and second (t2) measurement 
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IEDs: V1t1 – V1t2 -10.93 < .001 1.51 
Knives: V1t1 – V1t2 -4.35 < .001 0.48 
Other: V1t1 – V1t2 -9.79 < .001 1.42 
Guns: V2t1 – V2t2 -5.46 < .001 0.82 
IEDs: V2t1 – V2t2 -9.99 < .001 1.45 
Knives: V2t1 – V2t2 -5.79 < .001 0.88 
Other: V2t1 – V2t2 -10.33 < .001 1.40 
    
Control group t(78) p d 
Guns: V1t1 – V1t2 -1.07 = .29 0.13 
IEDs: V1t1 – V1t2 -2.64 < .05 0.32 
Knives: V1t1 – V1t2 -1.87 = .07 0.25 
Other: V1t1 – V1t2 -0.05 =.96 0.01 
Guns: V2t1 – V2t2 -2.35 < .05 0.26 
IEDs: V2t1 – V2t2 -3.24 < .01 0.41 
Knives: V2t1 – V2t2 -1.81 = .07 0.24 
Other: V2t1 – V2t2 -2.11 < .05 0.28 
In summary, very similar results as in Experiment 1 have been found in 
Experiment 2. A large and significant training effect was observed for the 
group who trained with XRT compared to a control group who used a 
conventional CBT for the same time. A significant training effect has been 
observed for all four categories (guns, knives, IEDs and other) for the XRT 
training group, whereas the effect size varied between categories. Also a 
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large transfer of the acquired knowledge about the visual appearance of 
trained objects (set A) to untrained but similar looking objects (set B) was 
found for the XRT training group. Additionally a viewpoint effect could be 
observed which shows that unusual views of forbidden objects are much 
harder to detect than canonical views. In contrast to Experiment 1, the 
control group also showed increases of detection performance, which 
implies that the conventional CBT used in Experiment 2 is more effective 
than the one used in Experiment 1 (although still much less effective than 
XRT). Moreover, there was also a transfer effect for the control group. 
4.3.9 General Discussion 
The first aim of this study was to investigate how well airport security 
screeners can detect guns, knives, IEDs and other prohibited items in x-ray 
images of passenger bags. Two experiments conducted at two European 
airports provided very similar results. A computer-based test (X-Ray CAT) 
was conducted before and after three and six months of weekly (about 20 
min per screener) CBT at each airport. The first measurement revealed that 
guns were detected best, followed by knives, other prohibited items and 
IEDs. In both experiments and airports, one group used an adaptive CBT 
(X-Ray Tutor, XRT) with individually adaptive algorithms, a large library of 
prohibited items depicted in a variety of different views, and automatically 
created prohibited item to bag combinations (see Schwaninger, 2004 for 
details). The other group used a conventional CBT system with no adaptive 
algorithms, a smaller image library, and fixed combinations of threat items 
in bags. While XRT was used in both experiments and airports, two 
different conventional CBT systems were used for the control groups of 
Experiment 1 (airport 1) and Experiment 2 (airport 2). At both airports, XRT 
training group results revealed a training effect for all types of threat objects 
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(guns, knives, IEDs, and other prohibited items). However, effect sizes 
differed remarkably for the four categories. While guns were detected best 
and IEDs were detected worst at the beginning, IED detection of the XRT 
training group was as good as or even slightly better than gun detection 
after several months of training. This shows that the detection of IEDs is not 
difficult per se, but rather depending on the training of screeners. Note that 
all IEDs used in this study contained a detonator, wires, explosive, a 
triggering device and a power source. Therefore, these conclusions are 
only applicable to the detection of such multi-component IEDs. However, a 
large training effect for IEDs can be expected because they are usually not 
encountered at airport security checkpoints and therefore not known to 
screeners without enhanced training in IED detection. The relatively large 
training effect for the category “other” which includes self defense gas 
spray, electric shock devices etc. might also be explained by less on the job 
exposure of these prohibited items. In a study with hold baggage screeners, 
large training effects for IEDs were also found, which is very consistent with 
results of this study (Schwaninger and Hofer 2004). In contrast to IEDs and 
other prohibited items, guns seem to be well known by screeners either 
because of their typical shape or the frequency by which they are 
encountered at the airport security screening checkpoint (e.g., toy guns). 
Therefore, detection performance before training is already high for guns 
and a large improvement is impossible. It is also noticeable that detection 
for knives showed the smallest training effect in both experiments. Although 
the detection was at the baseline measurement higher than for IEDs and 
other prohibited items, after six months of training screeners’ performance 
was poorest for knives. On average, knives are smaller than IEDs and other 
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threat items and show less diagnostic features. This might be a reason for 
the lower detection performance increase for this threat category. 
While training with XRT resulted in large training effects, the tested 
conventional CBT systems were less effective. In Experiment 1, there were 
no training effects at all, while only small training effects were observed for 
the conventional CBT system used in Experiment 2. This could be due to 
one or a combination of the following reasons: First, the conventional CBT 
systems tested in this study do not feature individually adaptive training 
algorithms like XRT (see Schwaninger, 2004 for details). Second, in 
contrast to XRT, the conventional CBT systems did not contain such a large 
image library with many prohibited items depicted from a variety of different 
viewpoints. Third, while in XRT prohibited items are blended into x-ray 
images of passenger bags on the fly using scientifically validated and 
individually adaptive algorithms based on image measurement as described 
in Schwaninger et al. (2007), the conventional CBT systems used in 
Experiment 1 and 2 have only fixed combinations of prohibited items in 
bags. Finally, we had to rely on the statement of the appropriate authority 
and the security companies regarding the amount of training that was 
conducted by screeners of the control group and the XRT training group, 
which should have been on average 20 min per week per screener. 
Analysis of XRT training data showed, that this was clearly fulfilled for 
screeners of the XRT training group at both airports. 
Since the X-Ray CAT is composed of two comparable (similar looking) sets 
(set A and set B) whereof only the threat objects of set A were included into 
the XRT training system, transfer effects can be tested, i.e. whether training 
with certain prohibited items helps increasing detection of other prohibited 
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items that are not contained in the training. Overall, the comparison of the 
two sets A and B at the baseline measurement (before training) shows no 
significant difference. However, in Experiment 1 there was a slight 
difference for the control group between the two sets indicating that the two 
sets are not exactly equal in terms of image difficulty for this sample. But 
this possible objection to the transfer effect can be disapproved with two 
arguments: first, the effect size was only small according to the conventions 
by Cohen (1988) and second, only one of the two control groups showed a 
significant difference. Therefore, the transfer effect in the results of the XRT 
training group can be attributed to the training of set A only. The small 
training effect for the control group in Experiment 2 is also reflected in the 
detection increase of both sets after training. Although the conventional 
CBT system of this control group did not contain any objects from the test. 
The training with this training system apparently also led to a transfer of the 
knowledge to the objects in the test. In another study it would be interesting 
to compare the objects that are comprised in the two training systems used 
by the control groups regarding their similarity to the test objects. Contrary 
to our results, Smith, Redford, Gent, and Washburn (2005) found a large 
decrease in screeners’ detection performance when specific trained objects 
were replaced with new images belonging to the same categories (see also 
Smith, Redford, Washburn, and Taglialatela 2005). According to these 
authors, improvement in screening performance is attributable only to 
specific-token familiarity that developed for the original images and not to a 
category generalization. They state constraints on categorization and the 
use of category-general information when humans face visual complexity 
and have to identify targets within it. Our results can be interpreted in 
support of generalization of visual learning in x-ray image interpretation. 
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However, it might be possible that the objects of the untrained set in our 
study are so similar to the trained objects that a specific-token familiarity led 
to the detection performance increase and not a true generalization effect. 
The lacking transfer effect in knives would along these lines mean that the 
objects in set A and set B are not similar enough in shape to generate a 
specific-token familiarity. Therefore only the learnt objects could generate a 
training effect but not the unlearnt ones. For Schwaninger and Hofer’s 
(2004) findings of a large increase in detection performance of IEDs after 
recurrent CBT with other members of the category than those included in 
the test, it would mean, that those objects were very similar in order to 
create a specific-token familiarity and therefore a training effect. 
In both Experiments a large viewpoint effect was also revealed. This is 
consistent with view-based theories of object recognition (for reviews see 
for example Tarr and Bülthoff, 1995, 1998; Graf et al., 2002; Hayward, 
2003). After training, easy and difficult views were recognized much better. 
Interestingly, there was no significant interaction between measurement 
and viewpoint, i.e. although training resulted in improved performance for 
difficult views, the viewpoint effect (impairment for unusual vs. canonical 
views) remained stable even after six months of training. However, it must 
be pointed out that the XRT training algorithm only provides the screeners 
with unusual views of objects once a screener can detect a prohibited item 
well when depicted from easy perspective. That is, when screeners start to 
train with XRT all threat objects are shown in easy views. Only if these 
objects are detected reliably, the difficulty level is increased for a certain 
threat item by showing it in more difficult views (Schwaninger, 2004). Thus, 
it is unclear whether a significant interaction between viewpoint and 
measurement would have been observed if the training duration would have 
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been increased (e.g., to one year). The conclusion stands to reason that 
recognition of forbidden objects in x-ray images is dependent on exposure 
which has very important implications for an adaptive training system. It has 
been assumed that different views of each object become associated with 
one another during object rotation, either through active learning or through 
passive experiencing of the successive appearance of nearby views 
(Földiák, 1991; Stryker, 1991). Hence, it is important that during training 
screeners are getting feedback which forbidden object has been detected 
or missed. This feedback shows the photograph and also the x-ray image of 
that forbidden object always in the canonical view whereas the forbidden 
object merged into a bag is presented in different viewpoints. This leads to 
an association between an unusual view of an object and the canonical 
view which results in a sequential pairing of these views with each other 
(Wang, Obama, Yamashita, Sugihara and Tanaka, 2005). This association, 
which forms during learning, is thought to underlie object recognition ability 
across changes in viewing angle (Palmeri and Gauthier, 2004). 
For our future studies, it could also be interesting to increase the interval 
between the end of training and the testing of training transfer, as 
corresponding literature usually tests transfer of training after a 
considerable period of time in order to measure the stability of the transfer 
(e.g., Saks and Belcourt, 2006). In any case, our findings show that the 
knowledge about the visual appearance of forbidden objects, which airport 
security screeners acquire during recurrent CBT, can be transferred to 
similar looking, but not previously seen objects and also the effect that 
rotated views are much harder to detect can be decrease with training. To 
make sure that objects are well detected it is important that a large and 
representative image library of prohibited objects is used and that these 
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objects are learned from different viewpoints. Additionally the library should 
be updated constantly to adapt to new threats. Overall, this study has 
shown that adaptive CBT can be a powerful tool to increase screeners’ x-
ray image interpretation competency in an efficient and effective way. 
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5 Benefits and Costs of New X-Ray Image Technology  
5.1 Do multi-view X-ray systems improve X-ray image 
interpretation in airport security screening? 
5.1.1 Abstract 
X-ray screening of passenger bags is one of the core elements in aviation 
security in order to prevent terrorist attacks. Large investments have been 
made into new technologies, for example in multi-view X-ray systems. 
Because of several X-rays, multi-view systems provide more than one X-ray 
image of the same passenger bag and hence present the security screener 
multiple perspectives of that bag. In this study, we evaluated the benefit of 
multi-view X-ray systems compared with state-of-the-art single-view X-ray 
systems. Single- and multi-view X-ray images of passenger bags were 
presented to 32 novices who had to decide if the bag contained a prohibited 
item or not. The results show that multi-view X-ray systems lead to a higher 
detection performance of prohibited items in difficult conditions, such as 
when it is rotated in a non-canonical manner or superimposed by other 
objects. Additionally, the results indicate an increase of the reaction time for 
performing the screener’s task with multi-view in comparison with single-
view X-ray systems. A specific training for airport’s security screeners might 
increase the advantages and reduce the disadvantages of multi-view X-ray 
systems. 
5.1.2 Introduction 
The increasing threat of terrorist attacks in recent years has led to large 
investments into technological enhancements in aviation security. One main 
focus continues to be the improvement of the process of X-ray screening of 
passenger bags to prevent forbidden objects getting past the security 
122 
 
checkpoint. Some airports have started using technologies of the newest 
generation for the process of cabin baggage screening, such as multi-view 
X-ray systems. Certain multi-view X-ray systems even provide automated 
detection of explosives, leading to a substantial improvement of security. 
However, for the detection of other types of prohibited items, airports still 
rely on human operators (airport security screeners) who visually inspect X-
ray images.  
The task of threat object detection depends on knowledge-based and 
image-based factors (Hardmeier et al., 2005; Schwaninger et al., 2004). 
Knowledge-based factors refer to knowing which items are prohibited and 
what they look like in X-ray images of passenger bags. Some objects look 
quite different in X-ray images than in reality, for example an electric shock 
device, which is difficult to differentiate from ordinary objects (see Figure 
34). Others, such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), are rarely seen in 
everyday life as well as at the security checkpoint and are, therefore, 
difficult to recognize without the appropriate training. 
 
Figure 34: Illustration of the impact of knowledge-based factors. Some forbidden objects such as the 
electric shock device shown above look quite different in X-ray images than in reality. 
Furthermore, image-based factors play an important role in threat object 
detection. These can be attributed to the visual abilities of a person, that is, 
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how he or she copes with image difficulty. Schwaninger (2003) described 
three image-based factors: rotation, superposition, and bag complexity 
(Figure 35).  
 
Figure 35: Image-based factors with an impact on threat detection performance: (a) easy and difficult 
rotation, (b) low and high superposition, and (c) low and high bag complexity. 
The fact that object recognition often yields strong effects of viewpoint 
caused by the rotation of an object (e.g. Bülthoff & Edelman, 1992; Graf et 
al., 2002; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995, Tarr & Bülthoff, 1998), is essential for X-ray 
image interpretation. In general, X-ray images of forbidden objects are 
difficult to recognize when depicted from an unusual viewpoint and when 
diagnostic features are not visible.  
Another important factor contributing to image difficulty is the superposition 
of the threat object by other objects in a bag. The effect of superposition 
refers to the impairment of figure-ground segregation. If a threat object, 
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such as a knife, is superimposed by high density material, it becomes more 
difficult to recognize the characteristic shape of the object. 
Furthermore, the complexity of a bag, determined by the number and type 
of objects in the bag, has a significant influence on the detection 
performance. Recently, the effects of the image-based factors rotation, 
superposition and bag complexity have been replicated, and statistical 
algorithms for estimating image difficulty have been developed 
(Schwaninger et al. 2007b).  
Besides coping with knowledge-based and image-based factors, the 
screener has to detect a threat object in a limited amount of time. During 
rush hour at the security checkpoint, screeners often have only a few 
seconds to visually inspect the X-ray images of passenger bags. 
There is evidence that perceptual training can help to improve the ability to 
segment objects from cluttered visual scenes (e.g. Brady & Kersten, 2003; 
Kourtzi et al., 2005; Kovacs et al., 1999; Li & Gilbert, 2002; Yi et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that a specific X-ray screening training 
increases the X-ray image interpretation competency and decreases 
reaction times (Koller et al., 2007, Koller et al., 2008; McCarley et al., 2004; 
Michel et al., 2007; Schwaninger et al., 2007a). Such a computer-based 
object recognition training affects mainly knowledge-based factors and the 
detection of rotated objects (Schwaninger et al., in press). Through training, 
airport’s security screeners learn which objects are prohibited and how they 
appear in X-ray images. The screeners also store different and often 
unfamiliar views of the objects in visual memory (Michel et al., 2007). 
Effects of image-based factors might also be diminished by recent 
technological improvements. Multi-view X-ray systems produce two or more 
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images of one object due to several X-rays. In airport security screening 
this means that the decision of the screener, if a passenger bag is OK or 
not, is supported by multiple images of the same bag. Threat objects that 
are rotated in a non-canonical manner or superimposed by other objects in 
the bag might be recognized easier when a second, e.g. 90 degree rotated 
view, is available. Assuming that visual search needs more time for multiple 
images than for a single image, reaction times are probably longer for multi-
view than for single-view X-ray systems. 
In this study, we conducted an experiment in order to investigate what 
impact multiple views have on the detection performance as well as on the 
reaction time of a screening person. In order to eliminate the influence of 
knowledge-based factors, we conducted the experiment with novices who 
had no prior expertise in X-ray screening, and we presented only threat 
objects, whose appearance is relatively common in everyday life, such as 
guns and knives. We will examine the impact of the X-ray system on the 
introduced image-based factors rotation and superposition, as well as on 
the reaction time.  
Our hypothesis is that with multi-view X-ray systems, the detection 
performance increases especially for difficult conditions, i.e. a difficult 
rotation or a high superposition of the threat item, based on the assumption 
that a second view might eliminate or at least reduce the negative influence 
of the introduced image-based factors. Additionally, reaction times probably 
increase for multi-view X-ray systems in comparison with single-view X-ray 
systems because visual search needs more time for multiple images, as 
mentioned above. 
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5.1.3 Method 
5.1.3.1  Participants 
Thirty-two undergraduate students from the University of Zurich volunteered 
to participate in this study; 20 females and 12 males with age ranging from 
19 to 50 years (M = 26.69 years, SD = 6.35 years). All participants reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were all naive with regard to the 
hypotheses under investigation.  
5.1.3.2  Material 
For our experiment we constructed a test consisting of X-ray images of 
passenger bags by using a multi-view X-ray system. The approximate 
directions of the two X-ray beams are illustrated schematically in Figure 36. 
 
Figure 36: Schematic illustration of the approximate directions of the two X-ray beams A and B. 
One half of the total of 128 bags in our experiment had a low, and the other 
half a high bag complexity. We calculated the level of bag complexity using 
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the formula for transparency, which reflects the extent to which X-rays are 
able to penetrate objects in a bag, as described by Schwaninger et al. 
(2007b): 
ܴܶ ൌ  
∑ ሺܫேሺݔ, ݕሻ ൏ ݐ݄ݎ݁ݏ݄݋݈݀ሻ௫,௬
∑ ሺܫேሺݔ, ݕሻ ൏ 255ሻ௫,௬
 
IN(x, y) denotes the pixel intensities, whereas threshold is the pixel intensity 
threshold beneath which the pixels are counted.  
All of the bags were used twice, once combined with a prohibited item, and 
once without any threat object. The threat objects have been captured by 
experts of Zurich State Police, Airport division. Because we tested novices 
who were not trained in recognizing unfamiliar objects like IED, we only 
used eight guns and eight knives to eliminate effects of knowledge-based 
factors. Each threat item was presented in two different rotations. The easy 
rotation shows the object from a canonical perspective (Palmer et al., 1981) 
as judged by two security experts who captured the stimuli. The difficult 
rotation shows the threat item 85 degree rotated horizontally or vertically 
relative to the canonical view.  
Every threat item was combined with a bag in a manner that the degree of 
superposition by other objects was low, and with another bag in a manner 
that the degree of superposition by other objects was high. For this purpose 
we used the formula for superposition as described by Schwaninger et al. 
(2007b): 
ܵܲ ൌ ඨ෍ሺܫௌேሺݔ, ݕሻ െ  ܫேሺݔ, ݕሻሻ²
௫,௬
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The function computes the difference between the pixel intensity values of 
the bag image with the threat object (ISN(x, y)) minus the pixel intensities of 
the corresponding harmless bag (IN(x, y)).  
Every image was once presented as single-view and once as multi-view 
trial. The single-view condition consisted of one view (see Figure 37, X-ray 
A), i.e. one image was shown, the multi-view condition consisted of two 
views (see Figure 37, X-rays A and B), i.e. two images were presented at 
once on the same screen. The size of the bag images was consistent 
regardless of the condition. As shown in Figure 37b, the first view (left side) 
of the multi-view trial was identical with the corresponding single-view trial, 
whereas the second view (right side) was an image of the same bag from 
another angle.  
 
Figure 37: (a) A single-view trial containing a knife in a difficult rotation and high superposition and (b) the 
corresponding multi-view trial. In the second view of the multi-view trial, the rotation of the threat object is 
easy and the superposition low. 
The variation of the image-based factors rotation, superposition, and bag 
complexity resulted in eight variations for the single-view condition, and, 
therefore, also for the first view of the multi-view condition. In the second 
view, we varied the factors rotation and superposition again, resulting in 
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another four variations for the second view: easy rotation and low 
superposition, easy rotation and high superposition, difficult rotation and low 
superposition, and difficult rotation combined with high superposition. 
These four variations of the second view have been balanced throughout 
four groups of participants (cp. Table 17). Overall, 512 trials were 
presented: 16 (threat objects) * 23 (image-based factors rotation, 
superposition, bag complexity) * 2 (single-/multi-view X-ray system) * 2 (bag 
with/without threat item). 
Table 17: Design of multi-view and single view trials 
Multi-view variations of bags containing a threat item
  Second view 
Bag and its 
complexity First view g1 g2 g3 g4 
low      
1 t1r1s1 t1r1s1 t1r2s1 t1r1s2 t1r2s2 
2 t2r1s1 t2r2s1 t2r1s2 t2r2s2 t2r1s1 
3 t3r1s1 t3r1s2 t3r2s2 t3r1s1 t3r2s1 
4 t4r1s1 t4r2s2 t4r1s1 t4r2s1 t4r1s2 
… … … … … … 
high      
… … … … … … 
128 t16r2s2 t16r2s2 t16r1s1 t16r2s1 t16r1s2 
Note. Each multi-view pair was combined once with low, and once with high bag 
complexity. g = participant group (1-4), t = threat item (1-16), r = rotation (1: easy, 2: 
difficult), s = superposition (1: low, 2: high). 
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5.1.3.3  Procedure 
All participants performed the test in a training classroom at Zurich Airport, 
where we were able to maintain standardized conditions regarding lighting, 
computer and monitor settings. 
First, we tested the color perception of the participants using Ishihara’s test 
of colour-blindness (2003). All participants scored 100% correct. 
Within the introduction, participants were shown 16 X-ray images of guns 
and knives which were not used in the experiment in order for them to get 
an idea of what such weapons look like in X-ray images. After 4 practice 
trials, participants had to accomplish the 512 trials (single-view and multi-
view mixed). They had to decide whether the bag presented was OK 
(contains no threat item) or NOT OK (contains a threat item) by clicking the 
respective button on the screen. Additionally, participants were asked to 
indicate how confident they were in their decision by clicking on a rating 
scale (non-visible 100 point) on the screen.  
The 512 trials have been subdivided into four blocks and participants were 
allowed to take a short break after completing each block. Trials were 
randomized within each block and block order was counterbalanced across 
two groups of participants. Completing the experiment took about 60-90 
minutes. 
5.1.4 Results 
We calculated the detection performance of the participants using the signal 
detection measure d’, which is derived from hit and false-alarm rates 
(Green & Swets, 1966). While the hit rate refers to the proportion of all 
images containing a prohibited item that have been judged as NOT OK, the 
false-alarm rate refers to the proportion of NOT OK judgments for harmless 
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bags. The advantage of d’ as a sensitivity measure is the fact that it is 
invariant when factors other than sensitivity change (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). For calculating d’ we used the following formula:  
݀ᇱ ൌ  ݖሺܪሻ െ  ݖሺܨܣሻ 
H is the hit rate, FA the false alarm rate and z refers to the z transformation. 
Across all conditions, there was no significant difference in d’ between 
single-view and multi-view X-ray system, t(31) = -0.53, p = .30, d = 0.04.  
Before we examined the impact of the X-ray system on the image-based 
factors rotation and superposition, we analyzed the data obtained in the 
single-view condition to verify the existence of the image-based factors 
rotation and superposition as proposed by Schwaninger (2003). For this 
purpose, we conducted a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for 
repeated measures using d’ scores with the within-participant factors 
rotation and superposition. It revealed large main effects of rotation, F(1, 
31) = 87.17, p < .001, η2 = .74, and superposition, F(1, 31) = 157.72, p < 
.001, η2 = .84. There was also a large interaction of rotation and 
superposition, F(1, 31) = 31.52, p < .001, η2 = . 50. Figure 38 shows the 
effects of the image-based factors for the single-view condition. Remember 
that the easy rotation corresponds to a canonical view, and the difficult 
rotation to an 85 degree rotated view of the threat object around the vertical 
or horizontal axis. Superposition indicates how much the threat object is 
superimposed by other objects in the bag. 
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Figure 38: Effects of the image-based factors rotation and superposition for the single-view condition. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). Note that performance values are not reported 
due to security reasons. However, in order to provide scientifically meaningful results, effect sizes are 
reported throughout the paper. 
As a next step, we compared the detection performance in difficult single-
view conditions with the detection performance in the corresponding 
difficult-easy multi-view conditions, when the first view shows the difficult 
single-view condition and the second view the according easy condition, i.e. 
the threat object was presented in a canonical rotation or, respectively, with 
a low superposition (this is actually the case in Figure 4). An ANOVA for 
repeated measures with the two within-participants factors display condition 
(single-view, multi-view) and image-based factor (rotation, superposition) 
revealed a large main effect of the display condition F(1, 31) = 25.03, p < 
.001, with an effect size of η2 = .45, but not for the image-based factors F(1, 
31) = 0.24, p = .63, η2 = .01. The interaction for display condition and 
image-based factor was also not significant F(1, 31) = 0.34, p = .56, η2 = 
.01. The pairwise comparisons revealed a significant increase of the 
detection performance for the multi-view condition, once for rotation, t(31) = 
-3.46, p < .001, with an effect size of d = 0.27, and once for superposition 
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t(31) = -3.99, p < .001, d = 0.74, as shown in Figure 39. According to Cohen 
(1988), the effect sizes are small (rotation) and medium (superposition). 
 
Figure 39: Effects of the display condition on the image-based factors rotation and superposition. Single-
view difficult condition means a difficult rotation or a high superposition. In the difficult-easy multi-view 
condition, the first view was the same as in the difficult single-view condition, and the second view showed 
the threat object canonically rotated or with low superposition. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean (SEM). Note that performance values are not reported due to security reasons. 
The increase of detection performance for the difficult-easy multi-view 
condition in comparison with the difficult single-view condition should also 
be reflected by a higher average level of confidence ratings. Therefore, we 
conducted an ANOVA for repeated measures using the mean value of 
confidence rating with the two within-participants factors display condition 
(single-view, multi-view) and image-based factor (rotation, superposition). 
We found a large main effect of the display condition, F(1, 31) = 18.03, p < 
.001, η2 = .37, but not for the image-based factors F(1, 31) = 0.78, p = .38, 
η2 = .03. The interaction for display condition and image-based factor was 
also not significant F(1, 31) = 0.34, p = .56, η2 = .01. Pairwise comparisons 
disclosed a significant gain of confidence, both for rotation: t(31) = -3.51, p 
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< .001, d = 0.39, as well as for superposition, t(31) = -3.40, p < .001, d = 
0.44, see also Figure 40. 
 
Figure 40: Effect of the display condition on the confidence ratings. Error bars represent standard errors of 
the mean (SEM). 
Furthermore, a t-test confirmed the hypothesis that reaction times increase 
for the multi-view display condition in comparison with the single-view 
display condition, t(31) = -12.49, p < .001, d = 0.48, see also Figure 41.  
 
Figure 41: Effect of the display condition on the reaction time. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean (SEM). 
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5.1.5 Discussion 
In this study, we conducted an experiment to investigate the impact of 
multiple views, provided by multi-view X-ray systems, on the threat object 
detection performance of novices. An analysis of the data pooled across all 
conditions revealed that there are no significant differences between the 
detection performance measured in d’ for single-view and multi-view X-ray 
systems. 
We hypothesized that the use of multi-view X-ray techniques might help 
especially in difficult conditions, if the threat object contained in a bag is in a 
difficult rotation or highly superimposed by other objects. In order to confirm 
this hypothesis, we first had to analyze the single-view data, to see whether 
we were able to replicate the effects of rotation and superposition as 
proposed by Schwaninger (2003). There were large main effects of rotation 
and superposition, and also an interaction of the two image-based factors. 
These results show that detection performance decreases for difficult 
single-view conditions.  
According to our hypothesis, the threat object detection performance for the 
difficult conditions described above should increase, if the screening person 
is supported by a second view showing the threat object in an easy rotation 
or with a low superposition. The results of our experiment confirm this 
hypothesis. Moreover, the increase of detection performance with the multi-
view X-ray system for difficult conditions is also reflected by a significant 
increase of the confidence indicated by ratings.  
A probable explanation for the fact that detection performance does not 
increase in general for the multi-view X-ray system, but only for difficult-
easy multi-view conditions might be that only in this condition the 
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information contained in the second view is novel and helpful. In contrast, 
two difficult or two easy views are redundant. 
Comparing the effect sizes indicates that the X-ray system has mainly an 
impact on superposition with a medium effect size. Whereas X-ray 
screening training has large effects on the detection of difficult rotated 
objects (Koller et al., 2008; Michel et al., 2007), Schwaninger et al. (in 
press) found no interaction of training and superposition. Even though our 
experiment revealed an effect of the X-ray system on rotation, the key 
benefit of multi-view X-ray systems rather seems to be the support of 
airport’s security screeners to cope with the challenges imposed by 
superposition. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis that reaction times increase in the multi-view 
condition, is confirmed, although it is only a small effect. The prolonged 
reaction times might be explained by the additional time needed for the 
visual search through two images instead of one.  
In this study, we demonstrated that multi-view X-ray systems can support 
airport’s security screeners in challenging situations, i.e. when objects in a 
passenger bag are difficult to recognize due to rotation or superposition. 
There is also a negative side-effect resulting from the multiple views: the 
prolonged reaction times. Previous research has shown that reaction times 
decrease after a certain amount of X-ray screening training (Michel et al., 
2007; Schwaninger et al.,, 2007a). 
Therefore, an adaptive computer-based training for multi-view X-ray 
systems which provides a realistic learning environment might be a way to 
tap the full potential of this novel technology. 
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6 XRT Levels and Training Duration Recommendations 
6.1 Relationship between level of detection performance and 
amount of recurrent computer-based training  
6.1.1 Abstract  
The usefulness of X-Ray Tutor (XRT) as an individually adaptive 
computer-based training system for aviation security screening officers to 
increase X-ray image interpretation competency has been proven in several 
studies.  Many airports require their screening officers to conduct weekly 
recurrent training in order to enhance their capabilities and competencies.  
During training, X-ray images of passenger bags similar to how they appear 
at the security checkpoint have to be judged regarding the dangerousness 
of their content.  Screening officers have to detect threat objects within the 
bags and discriminate harmless objects from threat objects.  The advantage 
of XRT is its level-based construction.  The training begins at the lowest 
difficulty level and increases in difficulty level with achieved performance for 
each screening officer individually.  The aim of this article is to create a 
guideline and norm regarding training requirements in order to ensure that 
screening officers maximize their training benefit.  Based on the X-Ray 
Tutor level algorithm we can express minimum requirements for screening 
officers in terms of image difficulty levels.  For example, the minimum level 
to be achieved in X-Ray Tutor after one year of recurrent training was 
determined based on normative data assuming that screeners take about 1-
2 training sessions of 20 minutes per week.  Alternatively, it can also be 
expressed as requirement to reliably detect threat items depicted in difficult 
views with high superposition and medium bag complexity.  
141 
 
Recommendations for standard reference levels and detailed background 
information on the X-Ray Tutor level are given. 
6.1.2 Introduction 
The high potential for wide-scale fatalities on aircrafts shows the importance 
of scientific research in the field of airport security.  Scientific research has 
gained high priority in the last years.  Some X-ray machines provide 
automated detection of threat objects.  Because of high false alarm rates of 
such technologies, the focus in X-ray image interpretation lies on the 
human operator who always makes the last decision if a passenger’s bag is 
harmless or if it contains a threat object.  One of the most important aspects 
therefore is that airport security screeners get individually adaptive training 
on X-ray image interpretation to enhance their knowledge about threat 
objects.  
The X-Ray Tutor training system (XRT) was developed by the Visual 
Cognition Research Group (VICOREG) at the University of Zurich as a 
scientifically based and well-proven training program to enhance X-ray 
image interpretation competency very effectively (Schwaninger, 2004; 
Koller, Hardmeier, Michel, Schwaninger, 2007).  The training program 
displays X-ray images of passenger bags, where screeners have to visually 
inspect the images and search them for threat objects like they do at the 
security checkpoint.  XRT is based on findings about how the human brain 
processes visual information in order to recognise objects in different views, 
when superimposed by other objects, and depending on bag complexity.  
One core advantage of XRT is that it is individually adaptive and level-
based.  In other words, when screeners train with X-Ray Tutor, they reach 
higher difficulty levels based on their individual detection performances. The 
question arises which level is recommended to be reached after a specific 
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amount of training time to guarantee a reliable and effective recognition of 
forbidden objects at the security checkpoint.  Therefore, one important 
aspect is that a standard for detection performance improvement is needed, 
which is the main goal of this article. 
Two approaches should be pursued:  
1) A standard should be defined by taking into account view difficulty, 
superposition, and bag complexity through XRT levels.  
2) The second approach is based on the data of several airports.  In the 
course of a project, aviation security screeners at these airports conducted 
recurrent computer-based training with XRT during at least one year.  We 
consider proposing a standard regarding which level in XRT screeners must 
have reached if they used the system for 12 months for 20 minutes per 
week on average. 
6.1.3 Image-based and knowledge-based factors 
Humans are adept at detecting different objects without any problems in a 
very short time as far as conditions are favourable.  As soon as the 
conditions become unfavourable, detection performance can decrease.  For 
example, if an object is superimposed by other objects, its shape is hard to 
separate (e.g., figure-ground segregation) and therefore recognition can 
become difficult.  In the same manner, recognition of rotated objects can be 
difficult when objects are seen from an unusual perspective.  An object can 
only be recognised when this particular object or a similar looking one has 
been seen before and been stored in visual memory.  However, if there is a 
large difference in the appearance (e.g., because it is seen from a different 
angle), it cannot be recognised well anymore (always under the assumption 
that it has never been seen before).  An object has to be seen from different 
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angles in order to store all these views in visual memory.  Then, the object 
can be recognised no matter which angle it is seen in.  Studies regarding 
object recognition indicate that for most objects six views are sufficient to 
capture the qualitative differences resulting from viewpoint changes 
because the human brain is able to interpolate between stored views 
(Schwaninger, 2004).  Additionally, if a scene (or a bag for instance) is very 
complex, problems in recognizing individual objects can occur.  Too much 
information distracts attention and impedes detection and recognition of 
objects.  These limitations that derive from the image itself are defined as 
image-based factors.  Schwaninger, Hardmeier and Hofer (2005) defined 
three image-based factors as important for X-ray image interpretation (see 
Figure 42): It is harder to detect an object in a rotated view compared to the 
upright view (effect of viewpoint).  The superposition of an object by others 
can impair the detection performance as well (effect of superposition).  A 
bag containing different objects and the type and number of these objects 
can distract visual attention and therefore also impair the detection 
performance (effect of bag complexity).  These image-based factors (view, 
superposition, and bag complexity) should be taken into account in an 
individually adaptive training for aviation security screeners.  
In other words, an individually 
adaptive training system should 
increase the difficulty of the 
training material (i.e., X-ray 
images of passenger bags, some 
of which contain threat objects) 
regarding these image-based 
factors by means of the individual Figure 42: Explanation of image‐based factors 
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performances.  For example, people are first trained with objects in easy 
rotations.  If a certain level of detection performance in reached, the level is 
increased and more difficult views of threat objects are displayed.  In higher 
levels, threat objects are more superimposed by other objects.  Finally bag 
complexity is increased; individually adapted to the performance and 
difficulties a screener has in coping with each of these image-based factors.  
If, for example, a screener has problems coping with rotated threat objects 
but not when threat objects are superimposed by other objects, then the 
screener gets augmented training on different viewpoints of threat objects.  
The training proceeds in this way until the screener is able to detect rotated 
threat objects reliably and the screener succeeded in overcoming the 
difficulties in that detection performance increases.  In addition, not only 
image-based factors are trained but also knowledge-based factors.  
Knowledge-based factors refer to the knowledge about which objects are 
prohibited and how they look like in X-ray images of passenger bags.  To 
improve the visual knowledge, a large and representative image library is 
required. 
6.1.4 X-Ray Tutor as an individually adaptive training system 
X-Ray Tutor (XRT) is a scientifically based training program in which 
screeners have to decide if an X-ray image of a passenger bag is harmless 
or not (see Figure 43).  The training is individually adaptive, that is to say, it 
automatically adapts to the performance of individual airport security 
screeners considering the difficulty of the images.  X-Ray Tutor 
automatically combines images of fictional threat items with X-ray images of 
passenger bags.  This is performed by an individually adaptive algorithm.  
X-Ray Tutor contains a large image library of threat objects that are X-rayed 
from different standardized views. Most of the objects can be depicted from 
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up to 72 different viewpoints, which 
allows training screeners to detect 
threat objects independent of 
viewpoint.  Additionally, threat objects 
from different threat categories (e.g., 
guns, knives, IEDs, other prohibited 
items) are integrated in XRT to make 
sure that a screener will be able to 
detect a large number of different 
threats.  This image library was built 
in close collaboration with experts of 
Zurich State Police Airport Division 
and other organizations, and it is 
being extended continuously.  The large image library is used in the 
individually adaptive training system in a way that objects which are poorly 
recognized are presented more often to a screener.  How superimposed 
such a threat object is or the complexity of a bag that threat objects is 
presented in is depending on the difficulty level (see Table 18 for an 
overview).  
How fast a screener reaches a higher level in XRT is dependant on the 
number of threat objects in the image library and on the screener’s 
performance.  X-Ray Tutor is available in two different versions.  XRT 
standard edition contains 100 threat objects in up to 72 views each.  XRT 
professional edition contains 400 threat objects also in up to 72 views each.  
In this article, the results are based on training with XRT standard edition. 
 
Figure 43: Screenshot of the XRT CBS 2.0 training 
system during training. At the bottom-right feedback 
is provided after each response. If a bag contains a 
prohibited item, an information window can be 
displayed (see bottom left of the screen). 
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Table 18: Difficulty levels in X-Ray Tutor  
 
During training with X-Ray Tutor, X-ray images of bags are presented on 
the screen for 15 seconds (standard setting).  Screeners have to decide 
whether the bag is OK (i.e. it contains no threat object) or whether it is NOT 
OK (i.e. it contains a threat object).  After each response, feedback is 
provided informing the screener whether his/her response was correct.  If 
the bag contained a threat object the screener can view detailed information 
and a real image of the threat object (see Figure 2).  For further information 
on X-Ray Tutor see Schwaninger, 2004. 
6.1.5 Previous studies supporting the effectiveness of X-Ray Tutor 
Different studies could show that there are large effects of viewpoint, 
superposition, and bag complexity due to training with XRT (Schwaniger et 
al., 2005; Hardmeier et al., 2006; Hofer, Hardmeier and Schwaninger, 
2006).  Supporting these findings, a recent study by Michel, de Ruiter, 
Hogervorst, Koller, Moerland and Schwaninger (2007) shows that there is 
Level Viewpoint Super-position Bag Complexity 
1 Easy Low Low 
2 Difficult Low Low 
3 Easy High Low 
4 Difficult High Low 
5 Easy Low Middle 
6 Difficult Low Middle 
7 Easy High Middle 
8 Difficult High Middle 
9 Easy Low High 
10 Difficult Low High 
11 Easy High High 
12 Difficult High High 
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an increase of detection performance not only for objects in easy but also 
for objects seen in difficult views. A study by Koller et al. (2007) shows that 
there is a very high increase of detection performance with the individually 
adaptive training system XRT compared to a training system which is not 
individually adaptive and uses a smaller image library (see Figure 44).  
These results are based on two measurements with the same test (X-Ray 
CAT, see Koller and Schwaninger, 2006) with 6 months of X-ray Tutor 
training between these measurements.  
Another important finding is that 
not only trained threat objects can 
be recognized better due to 
training.  It is also possible to 
increase recognition of visually 
similar objects (transfer effect).  A 
study conducted recently by Koller 
et al. (2007) supports this finding.  
Therefore, during training the 
knowledge about how X-ray images of threat objects look like transfers to 
the detection of other similar looking objects.  These findings are very 
important considering that not each threat object existing in the world has to 
be included in training.  It is necessary to include objects from various 
categories and to have a representative threat image library.  All in all the 
effectiveness of XRT is well proved in different studies. 
6.1.6 Methods 
We will mainly present the progress of the screeners’ training program 
regarding their difficulty level increase compared to the hours of training.  
XRT has been operational at different airports for the same duration.  
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Figure 44: Detection performance with standard 
deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
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Screeners were obligated to use XRT for 20 minutes per week for at least 
12 months.  For example, if a screener has used the training system once a 
week for 20 minutes during 12 months, he has used the system for a total 
of 16 hours.  
In total, data of 381 aviation 
security officers from four airports 
is included in this report.  They 
trained for 14.69 hours on 
average with a standard deviation 
of about 12.97 hours during 12 months.  For an overview of each of the four 
airports see Table 19.  In this article the results are based on XRT standard 
edition which contains 100 threat objects in up to 72 views.  
6.1.7 Recommendation for detection performance improvement 
For the recommendations, two approaches should be pursued:  
1) A standard should be defined by taking into account view difficulty, 
superposition, and bag complexity through XRT levels (see Table 1).  
2) A standard should be defined by taking into account training duration and 
level progress.  
6.1.7.1 Recommendation based on object recognition theories 
A standard should be defined by taking into account view difficulty, 
superposition, and bag complexity through XRT levels.  This minimum 
standard is based on object recognition theories which imply that an object 
can be recognised best when it has already been seen from different 
viewpoints.  Additionally, it is also important that the forbidden objects are to 
some extent superimposed by other objects in the training images to make 
Table 19: Number of screeners and training hours 
for each airport 
Airport
No. of 
Screeners
Training 
in months
Training 
hours (average)
Training 
hours (stdev.)
Airport 1 26 12 18.96 10.65
Airport 2 83 12 30.55 6.83
Airport 3 202 12 7.05 8.40
Airport 4 70 12 16.33 11.88
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sure that objects can be well recognised independent of the position inside 
the bag.  Finally, it is harder to find an object in a close-packed bag.  
Therefore, screeners should be able to recognise a threat object even if the 
bag is fully packed with many different harmless objects.  
X-Ray Tutor contains 12 levels regarding these three image-based factors 
(see Chapter III).  In the first level, easy viewpoints of threat items with low 
superposition and low bag complexity are presented.  The second level 
contains difficult viewpoints with low superposition and low bag complexity.  
In level three the superposition is increased whereas the viewpoint of threat 
items is easy and bag complexity is low.  See Table 1 for the combination of 
all 12 levels in X-Ray Tutor according viewpoint, superposition, and bag 
complexity.   
Regarding these image-based factors a screener should reach level 6 after 
one year of training to fulfil the theoretical assumptions from object 
recognition theories. In level 6, a screener has seen the threat objects from 
easy and difficulty viewpoints.  Furthermore, threat objects depicted in easy 
as well as in difficult orientations are presented with low and high 
superposition, respectively.  In addition, low and middle bag complexity 
levels have also been seen when people have reached level 6.  Therefore, 
screeners are exposed to almost all different image-based factors except 
high bag complexity.  This recommendation guarantees a reliable 
recognition for threat objects in almost all cases at the security checkpoint.  
Only very high complexities are not well trained so far.  When considering a 
bag too complex, screeners at the security checkpoint are obligated to 
search such a bag manually.  
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6.1.7.2 Recommendation based on data of airports which have trained 
for 12 months 
A very high correlation between the amount of training hours and the XRT 
level achievement was found with r 
= .93. 
Figure 45 shows the XRT level 
increase as a function of training 
duration (means and standard 
deviations) from real data of 381 
screeners from four different 
airports.  Note that the variation 
among screeners is large, with 
regards to how long it takes to reach a 
certain training level.  For example, to 
reach level 2, 4 hours of training are 
needed in average.  The standard 
deviation represents a substantial 
difference between people in making 
progress in levels.  
In Figure 46, the percentage of 
screeners in a specific level is shown.  
Most screeners (25.46%) are in level 
1, but none of them trained the 
requested amount of time of around 
20 minutes per week due to different 
reasons (e.g., job fluctuation).  Screeners in level 1 trained for about 1.37 
Figure 47: Minimum amount of training hours to 
reach a specific level in XRT. 
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hours within 12 months.  Screeners who used the system as requested (i.e. 
at least 20 minutes per week during 12 months) reached level 6 after one 
year of training.  
To conclude, based on these analyses from real data the recommendations 
for screeners is to reach level 6 after one year of training when XRT is used 
for about 20 minutes per week (in total 16 hours of training).  61.68% of all 
screeners in this report fulfilled this requirement and reached level 6 or 
higher after 12 months of training.  
In addition, Figure 47 shows the minimum amount of training hours needed 
to reach a specific level based on the same actual data from 381 screeners.  
For example, the minimum amount of training time required to reach level 6 
is 9.22 hours. To reach level 12 the best screener needed 21.88 hours of 
training.   
During a training session of about 20 minutes, a screener sees about 157 
X-ray images on average.  In Figure 48, the numbers of images that have 
been seen during training are shown for each level in XRT.  A very large 
correlation between XRT level achievement and number of images that 
have been seen during training was found with r = .96.  The same large 
correlation between training duration and number of images was found with 
r = .96.  In Figure 48 it can be seen 
that screeners have seen about 
8’094 images on average until they 
reach level 6 and more than 16’606 
X-ray images on average to reach 
level 12.  With such a large number 
of images screeners are well 
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exposed and familiarized to thousands of different X-ray images of 
passenger bags.  
Finally, if a screener does not reach level 6 after 12 months of training, it is 
important that the screener is using the training system more regularly and 
more frequently.  When screeners have reached level 12 it is important to 
update the image library with new threat objects for further increasing the 
knowledge about threat objects. 
6.1.8 Conclusions 
Because the human operator always has the last decision at the security 
checkpoint, it is important to point out that training is one of the core 
aspects in aviation security to guarantee a reliable and effective recognition 
of threat objects in passenger bags.  Without training, a screener is not able 
to detect threat objects reliably, especially because some threat objects 
(e.g., IEDs) are seen very rarely at the security checkpoint.  A training 
system should be individually adaptive to train screeners optimally based 
on their performances.  The effectiveness of XRT has been shown in many 
different studies (Hardmeier et al., 2006; Michel et al., 2007; Schwaninger 
and Hofer, 2004; Schwaninger, Hofer and Wetter, 2007; Koller, Hardmeier, 
Michel and Schwaninger, 2008).  For example, the study by Koller et al. 
(2007) showed very clear benefits for XRT.  In this study, a control group 
trains with a non-individually adaptive training system and is compared to a 
group which used an individually adaptive training system (X-Ray Tutor) for 
the same period.  Large training effects could only be found for the 
individually adaptive training group and not for the control group (see Figure 
3).  With all these findings, the importance of individually adaptive training 
cannot be neglected. 
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Another important aspect of the training system is that threat objects are 
presented in different difficulties like easy and difficult orientations, low and 
high superposition, and low and high bag complexity.  This is represented in 
different difficulty levels implemented in XRT.  The progress in these levels 
is dependent on the individual threat detection performances. 
The aim of this article is to create a guideline and norm regarding training 
requirements in order to ensure that screening officers maximize their 
training benefits.  Therefore, two recommendations based on object 
recognition theories and based on real XRT training data, respectively, are 
taken into account.  
Taking the findings together, the minimum standard after 20 minutes of 
training per week during 12 months (is equivalent to 16 hours of training in 
total) is that screeners have to reach level 6 in XRT.  When screeners have 
reached level 6, threat objects have been seen from different viewpoints, in 
low and high superposition, and also in medium bag complexities.  This 
fulfils the theoretical assumptions from object recognition theories for a 
reliable recognition of objects.  
In addition, real data shows that, on average, screeners reached level 6 
when they used XRT for 12 months for 20 minutes per week.  This supports 
the theoretical assumption and shows that it is realistically possible to fulfil 
these requirements. 
Finally, if XRT standard edition is used to prepare screeners for the initial 
certification tests, it is recommended to train with XRT standard edition for 
about 16 hours at least or to reach level 6.  Then, screeners should be well 
prepared for the certification test and for working at the security checkpoint. 
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To guarantee that the threat detection performance is stable, recurrent 
training with an appropriate training system and training duration (minimum 
20 minutes per week) is recommended.  
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7 Danksagung 
Die visuelle Wahrnehmung in einem angewandten Bereich wie der 
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